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ARTICLES
ON PUBLIC PLAINTIFFS AND PRIVATE HARMS: THE
STANDING OF MUNICIPALITIES IN CLIMATE
CHANGE, FIREARMS, AND FINANCIAL
CRISIS LITIGATION
RAYMOND H. BREscIA*
For more than a decade, cities have taken a lead role in the use of
affirmative tort litigation in attempts to combat some of the most press-
ing issues of the day: global climate change, the proliferation of firearms,
and the sale and marketing of subprime mortgage products. To date,
with some exceptions, these actions have only had limited success in
terms of securing outright court victories. Defendants in these cases have
raised successful defenses to some of these actions, including the follow-
ing: that their conduct was not the proximate cause of the harms the
cities alleged; that the issues raised by the cities were pre-empted by state
or federal law; or that the cities, as plaintiffs, lacked the requisite standing
to sue.1 If cities are to continue to use litigation as a tool to tackle these
and other social problems, they will have to overcome these defenses.
This article attempts to assess the current state of the law with
respect to one of these defenses: i.e., the standing of municipalities to
bring litigation to remedy the harms caused by private parties within city
limits. For this analysis, I review the decisions of courts handling three
types of municipal lawsuits that have arisen in recent years: suits by
municipalities against the firearms industry; suits by municipalities
against financial institutions in the wake of the financial crisis; and suits
* Assistant Professor of Law, Albany Law School; J.D., Yale Law School (1992);
B.A., Fordham University (1989); formerly the Associate Director of the Urban Justice
Center in New York City, a Skadden Fellow at The Legal Aid Society of New York, law
clerk to the Honorable Constance Baker Motley, and staff attorney at New Haven Legal
Assistance Association. I would like to thank my research assistant, Oriana Carravetta,
and my legal assistant, Fredd Brewer, for their invaluable assistance with this project. I am
also grateful for the helpful comments I received on previous drafts from Kathleen Engel
and Keith Hirokawa.
1. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Ameriquest Mortgage Sec., Inc., 621 F. Supp.2d
513 (N.D. Ohio 2009) (finding, inter alia, city's claims of public nuisance against invest-
ment banks pre-empted by state law and barred because city lacked standing for failure to
establish that defendants' conduct was the proximate cause of harms alleged).
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by government and private plaintiffs against the emitters of greenhouse
gas emissions alleged to be responsible for some of the harmful effects of
climate change. As part of this review, I analyze both the U.S. Supreme
Court's recent decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,2 as well as its decision
from the early 1970s, Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,3 in which
a city sued under the Fair Housing Act.
This review leads to several conclusions. First, when courts analyze
the standing of municipalities suing under nuisance theories, they often
fail to recognize that traditional approaches to public nuisance law under
the common law often permitted municipalities to bring suits on their
own, to prevent harm to their constituents, regardless of whether the city
suffered some harm to its own interests. A narrow reading of standing
doctrine promotes what some call a "private-law model" of standing, one
that espouses a view of standing recognizing only the types of "cases" and
"controversies" that were available under "traditional" causes of action,
and typically requires some sort of direct harm to a litigant in order for
that litigant to have standing to sue. This model fails to mesh with the
common law, however, which often recognized municipal plaintiffs as
the proper parties to challenge in courts of equity the action of private
actors carrying out a public nuisance. Indeed, courts entertaining such
actions did not question the "standing" of municipal plaintiffs; such
courts simply assessed these claims on the merits to determine whether
the municipal plaintiff had, in fact, proven that the defendant was caus-
ing a public nuisance. 4 As the following discussion of municipal actions
sounding in public nuisance makes clear, modern courts are applying
standing doctrine using a private-law model, one in which plaintiffs must
assert special damages in order to satisfy standing requirements. This
ignores the fact that for centuries courts have recognized that municipali-
ties could assert public nuisance claims without any special claim of
damages.
Thus, current standing law, which looks at municipalities as having
no special "public law" rights, is flawed, particularly when dealing with
public nuisance actions filed by municipalities. It fails to take into
account that, under the common law, municipalities, like states, were
able to bring suits in their own name for nuisances committed within
their borders. In light of this history, a re-evaluation of standing law as it
2. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
3. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
4. See, e.g., City of Grand Rapids v. Weiden, 56 N.W. 233 (Mich. 1893) (enter-
taining suit by municipality to enjoin operation of slaughterhouse without questioning
city's authority to sue); City of New York v. Montague, 145 A.D. 172, 175 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1911) (finding authority of city to sue to enjoin public nuisance well settled); City
of Huron v. Bank of Volga, 66 N.W. 815 (S.D. 1896) (reaching merits of city's nuisance
claim without questioning municipality's ability to bring suit).
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relates to the standing of municipalities when bringing nuisance actions
is therefore in order.
What also emerges from this review is that, when courts are deter-
mined to utilize the private-law model of standing, municipal plaintiffs
are in the strongest position to claim standing when they assert rights as
property owners, and when they allege a reduction in their tax base due
to the defendant's direct actions. This is true even when other forces
might also negatively affect the value of the property that the municipal-
ity itself owns, or the value of the property comprising its local tax base.
Thus, municipal plaintiffs are most likely in their strongest position
when they characterize the injuries they suffer as "private" harms, as
opposed to the harms suffered by them as "public"-that is, governmen-
tal-litigants.
This article is organized as follows. Part I is divided into four sec-
tions. First, I provide a brief overview of the doctrine of standing and
identify some of its key fault lines, some of which are implicated by the
discussion of the standing of municipalities. I next devote separate sub-
sections to standing decisions in each of the three areas introduced above:
climate change litigation, firearms lawsuits, and financial crisis litigation.
Part II is an attempt to synthesize these more modern decisions in light
of the Court's recent decision in Massachusetts, and the only Supreme
Court precedent on the subject of municipal standing from over forty
years ago, Gladstone Realtors.
I. MuNiciPAL LAWSUITS AND STANDING
A. Standing
Encapsulating standing in a few select words is difficult, but various
courts have outlined its basic contours, articulating both the constitu-
tional requirements of standing and its judicially constructed "pruden-
tial" limitations. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,5 the Supreme Court
described those constitutional requirements as follows:
Over the years, our cases have established that the irreducible con-
stitutional minimum of standing contains three elements. First,
the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an invasion of
a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical[.]"'
Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and
the conduct complained of-the injury has to be "fairly . . .
trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ...
th[e] result [ofi the independent action of some third party not
before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely
5. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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"speculative," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable
decision."
6
In addition to these basic standing requirements, courts have grafted
prudential limitations onto the core constitutional boundaries, which
have been described as follows:
Beyond the constitutional requirements, the federal judiciary has
also adhered to a set of prudential principles that bear on the ques-
tion of standing. Thus, this Court has held that "the plaintiff gen-
erally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot
rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third par-
ties." In addition, even when the plaintiff has alleged redressable
injury sufficient to meet the requirements of Art. III, the Court
has refrained from adjudicating "abstract questions of wide public
significance" which amount to "generalized grievances," perva-
sively shared and most appropriately addressed in the representa-
tive branches. Finally, the Court has required that the plaintiffs
complaint fall within "the zone of interests to be protected or reg-
ulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question."
7
It is an understatement to say that the standing doctrine is not with-
out its critics. Standing has been attacked as having no basis in the Con-
stitution, as a fig leaf for the political and personal proclivities of judges,
and as an incoherent doctrine.8 Despite this scholarly assault, standing
doctrine has shown no sign of weakening. Its supporters, some of whom
can be found in the highest levels of the federal judiciary, have given no
6. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990) and Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976)).
7. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church & State,
454 U.S. 464, 474-75 (1982) (citations and footnotes omitted) (quoting Warth v. Sel-
din, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970)).
8. For additional representative scholarship, see William A. Fletcher, The Structure
of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 223 (1988) ("[S]tanding is... formulated at a high level
of generality and applied across the entire domain of law. In individual cases, the general-
ity of the doctrine often forces us to leave unarticulated important considerations ....
This consequence is obvious in the apparent lawlessness of many standing cases when the
wildly vacillating results in those cases are explained in the analytic terms made available
by current doctrine."); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REv.
1741, 1758 (1999) ("[T]he doctrines that purport to govern standing disputes are suffi-
ciently malleable to allow the Justices to use them as tools to further their ideological
agendas."); Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries, "and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 167 (1992) ("[T]he very notion of 'injury in fact' is
... a large-scale conceptual mistake .... [Ilt injects common law conceptions of harm
into the Constitution. Moreover, it acts as if injury can be assessed through a purely
factual inquiry, rather than one that is inevitably a product of courts' value-laden judg-
ments .... This deep problem has been obscured by the surprising evolution of standing
principles.").
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indication of retreat, and federal courts seem comfortable deploying the
doctrine as a bar to litigation with regularity.9
At the same time, the U.S. Supreme Court's approach in Massachu-
setts seems to indicate some flexibility in the doctrine, and a willingness
to provide some guidance in its application. While the Massachusetts deci-
sion is nominally about the rights of states, which, the majority opinion
declared, are entitled to "special solicitude" in the standing analysis,"
there are also aspects of the decision that have implications for standing
doctrine generally. For instance, the doctrine arguably shows some lee-
way with respect to the standing of municipalities in particular, which
courts have viewed unfavorably in some of the recent decisions reviewed
below. Indeed, as the discussion in Part II addresses, many of the deci-
sions in firearms and financial crisis litigation likely need to be revisited
in light of the implications that flow from Massachusetts.
Moreover, it is also arguable that municipalities are entitled to some
"special solicitude" in standing analysis, similar to that which states
enjoy, and debatable whether the "private-law model" of standing-best
exemplified in the Court's holding in Lujan-should even apply in cases
that municipalities commence. I shall return to these questions in Part II.
The remainder of this Part will be devoted to an overview of standing
decisions in firearms, financial crisis, and climate change litigation with
implications for municipalities' suits in these and other areas.
B. The Standing of Municipalities in Firearms, Financial Crisis and
Climate Change Litigation
The first wave of the modern era of municipal litigation involved
suits by cities and localities looking to recoup the costs they incurred
when dealing with the fallout from the use of illegal guns on local streets.
These costs included outlays for increased police and hospital services. To
date, few of these cases have succeeded on the merits. The following
9. See, e.g., Kauai Kununa Dairy Inc. v. United States, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
114123 (D. Hawaii) (denying standing to companies alleging what were described as
.generalized grievances" in challenge to constitutionality of provision of the Jones Act);
ASPCA v. Feld Entm't, Inc. 677 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C 2009) (standing denied in case
alleging mistreatment of animals in captivity where animal handler could not establish
credible evidence of personal attachment to animals). Even in cases in which the plaintiffs
are found to have standing, courts routinely analyze whether the plaintiffs allege that they
have suffered an individualized and particularized harm. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw, Inc., 528 U.S. 167 (2000) (holding individuals who personally used area
threatened by potential discharge from wastewater treatment facility in violation of Clean
Water Act had standing to challenge such conduct); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Aikins,
524 U.S. 11 (1998) (holding plaintiffs who suffered direct injury by not having informa-
tion about donors to political action committee had standing to seek disclosure of such
information where required by statute).
10. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520.
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recounts how several courts have dealt with the issue of the plaintiff-
municipalities' standing to sue.
1. Firearms Litigation
In a sweeping decision based on both state law principles and fed-
eral precedents, in 2001 the Supreme Court of Connecticut affirmed the
dismissal of an action that the city of Bridgeport in that state and its
mayor commenced seeking both injunctive relief and damages from fire-
arms manufacturers, firearms trade associations, and firearms retailers. 1'
The city's complaint alleged a range of wrongful conduct on the part of
the defendants, including negligent manufacturing, advertising, and dis-
tribution of firearms; violation of state unfair trade practices laws; and
the creation of a public nuisance.'
2
Connecticut's high court summarized the harms the plaintiffs
alleged they suffered due to the defendant's conduct as follows:
As a result of the defendants' conduct, Bridgeport has incurred
increased expenses for police services, including courts, prisons
and related services, emergency services, pension benefits, health
care and social services, and has been required to impose related
increased tax burdens on Bridgeport taxpayers. Other harms
claimed are reduced property values, and loss of investment, eco-
nomic development and tax revenues due to lost productivity in
Bridgeport. In addition, the plaintiffs claim the harm of victimiza-
tion of Bridgeport's citizens, particularly its children, who are
injured or killed by handguns, including injuries by assault, and
deaths by homicide and suicide. Related harms claimed are high
levels of violent crime in Bridgeport, destroying families and com-
munities therein, particularly the minority communities, and a
negative impact on the lifestyle of children in certain residential
communities in Bridgeport. Finally, and in more general terms,
the plaintiffs claim the harms of a detrimental effect on the public
health, safety and welfare of the residents of Bridgeport, and on
their ability to be free from disturbance and apprehension of
danger. 3
The court identified the key question of the appeal as whether the
harms alleged were too remote from the defendants' conduct to establish
11. Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 780 A.2d 98 (Conn. 2001).
12. For an overview of the plaintiffs' claims, see Ganim, 780 A.2d. at 108-17
(including charges that firearms manufacturers knew of the unsafe design of their prod-
ucts and sold them anyway; and that they marketed their products in deceptive ways, like
advertising that a firearm in a home made its residents safer contrary to studies that
showed the risks of maintaining a firearm in the home include an increased risk of homi-
cide, accidental death and suicide).
13. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 134. See also Ganim v. Smith & Wesson Corp., No. CV
990153198S, 1999 WL 1241909, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 10, 1999).
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the plaintiffs' standing to bring the underlying litigation. The court rec-
ognized that this type of analysis was similar to a proximate cause analysis
utilized in assessing the validity of a tort claim, but nevertheless addressed
the issue as one of standing, as the lower court had as well. 14
The Supreme Court of Connecticut noted that it was persuaded by
the reasoning of the federal courts, including both the Second Circuit
and the U.S. Supreme Court, in prior rulings on issues of standing where
plaintiffs brought suit based on derivative harm, which is how the court
characterized the claims of Bridgeport and its mayor. In concluding that
the plaintiffs had alleged harms too remote to establish their standing to
sue in this context, the court relied on the Second Circuit's precedent in
Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc.1 5 There,
the court of appeals dismissed the claims of a union health insurance
fund for the costs associated with treating the smoking-related illnesses of
its beneficiaries. The Connecticut court concluded from that holding
that "where a plaintiff complains of injuries that are wholly derivative of
harm to a third party, plaintiffs injuries are generally deemed indirect
and as a consequence too remote, as a matter of law, to support
recovery." 6
The Supreme Court of Connecticut went on to cite the U.S.
Supreme Court's decision in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection
Corp., 17 which laid out principles for handling plaintiffs seeking standing
to sue for recourse for indirect injuries:
First, the more indirect an injury is, the more difficult it becomes
to determine the amount of plaintiffs damages attributable to the
wrongdoing as opposed to other, independent factors. Second,
recognizing claims by the indirectly injured would require courts
to adopt complicated rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs
removed at different levels of injury from the violative acts, in
order to avoid the risk of multiple recoveries. Third, struggling
with the first two problems is unnecessary where there are directly
injured parties who can remedy the harm without these attendant
problems. 1
8
Utilizing these factors, the court went on to trace what it described
as a causal chain that was supposedly untenable under current standing
jurisprudence. It outlined the steps that a handgun takes, from manufac-
14. Id. at 121 (addressing the overlap of these two concepts as follows: "Indeed, in
federal standing jurisprudence, the courts have considered the questions of proximate
cause-which we ordinarily analyze under the concept of duty-and standing as part and
parcel of the same inquiry.").
15. Laborers Local 17 Health & Benefit Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 191 F.3d 229
(2d Cir. 1999).
16. Ganim, 780 A.2d at 122.
17. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992).
18. Id. at 123 (citing Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269-70).
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ture and lawful sale to distributors, to lawful sale to legitimate retailers,
only to be passed on to consumers or illegitimate purchasers, and then on
to the black market and into the hands of illegitimate consumers. "Next,
either the authorized buyers misuse the guns by not taking proper storage
precautions or other unwarned or uninstructed precautions, or the unau-
thorized buyers misuse the guns to commit crimes or other harmful
acts."1 9 The court then continued:
Depending on the nature of the conduct of the users of the guns,
the plaintiffs then incur expenses for such municipal necessities as
investigation of crime, emergency and medical services for the
injured, or similar expenses. Finally, as a result of this chain of
events, the plaintiffs ultimately suffer the harms delineated previ-
ously, namely, increased costs for various municipal services,
increased tax burdens on Bridgeport taxpayers, reduced property
values, loss of investments and economic development in the city,
loss of tax revenues from lost productivity, injuries and deaths of
Bridgeport's residents, destruction of families and communities in
the city, and a negative impact on the lifestyle of certain children
in the city and on the ability of the residents to live free from
apprehension of danger.
20
Measuring this chain of causation against the Holmes factors, the
court found that the plaintiffs could not establish their standing to sue.
First, the numerous steps "between the conduct of the . . . defendants
and the harms suffered by the plaintiffs" were "strongly suggestive of
remoteness." 21 Second, the court noted how difficult it would be to
apportion harm resulting from the defendants' acts as opposed to other,
intervening forces. Indeed, the court went on at great length, in a state-
ment later echoed by the district court in the Baltimore subprime litiga-
tion described below, about the range of ills befalling a city like
Bridgeport and how difficult it would be to apportion damages.2 2
19. Id. at 123.
20. Id. at 123-24.
21. Id. at 124.
22. Specifically, the court found as follows:
The scourge of illegal drugs, poverty, illiteracy, inadequacies in the public edu-
cational system, the birth rates of unmarried teenagers, the disintegration of
family relationships, the decades long trend of the middle class moving from
city to suburb, the decades long movement of industry from the northeast "rust
belt" to the south and southwest, the swings of the national and state econo-
mies, the upward track of health costs generally, both at a state and national
level, unemployment, and even the construction of the national interstate high-
way system, to name a few, reasonably may be regarded as contributing to
Bridgeport's increased crime rate, including crimes committed with handguns,
and assault and suicide rates, increased costs of municipal services, reduced tax
base, loss of investment and development, and injuries to the communities that
make up Bridgeport and to its quality of urban life. It would require us to blink
ON PUBLIC PLAINTIFFS AND PRIVATE HARMS
Finally, the court noted that there were other potential plaintiffs
who might serve as more appropriate litigants because they would not
pose the same difficulties in apportioning harm and damages.2 3 The
court went on to discount other arguments the plaintiffs proffered to
establish their standing, and affirmed the lower court's dismissal on
standing grounds.24
at reality to minimize the enormous difficulty to be encountered in attempting
reliably to separate out the contribution of the defendants' conduct to those
harms from these other, independent factors.
Id. at 124-25.
23. Id. at 126-28 (holding direct victims of gun violence, like those assaulted by
attackers with handguns, would be more appropriate plaintiffs than municipality in suit
against handgun manufacturers).
24. Id. at 128-34. It is worth mentioning two additional cases that arose in the
lower courts of the Third Circuit. Those firearms actions-City of Philadelphia v. Beretta
U.S.A. Corp., 277 F.3d 415 (3d Cir. 2002), and Camden County Board of Chosen Free-
holers v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 273 F. 3d 536 (3d Cir. 2001)-sought, among other
relief, damages and injunctions against firearms manufacturers for what was alleged to
have been the negligent marketing and distribution of firearms in such a way that they
ultimately fell into the hands of criminals and/or children, where their use created a drain
on government resources. These cases did not deal with the standing issue directly.
Instead, the courts handling these cases dismissed them at least partly on the ground that
the harms alleged were too remote from the alleged illegal conduct of the defendants-a
conclusion reached by reviewing the claims' merits and assessing whether the plaintiffs
could prove that the defendants' actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiffs' harms.
In Camden County, the court recounted the defendants' arguments about the attenu-
ated chain of causation linking them to the harm the plaintiffs alleged as follows:
The manufacturers respond that the County's factual allegations amount to the
following attenuated chain of events: (1) the manufacturers produce firearms at
their places of business; (2) they sell the firearms to federally licensed distribu-
tors; (3) those distributors sell them to federally licensed dealers; (4) some of
the firearms are later diverted by unnamed third parties into an illegal gun
market, which spills into Camden County; (5) the diverted firearms are
obtained by unnamed third parties who are not entitled to own or possess
them; (6) these firearms are then used in criminal acts that kill and wound
County residents; and (7) this harm causes the County to expend resources to
prevent or respond to those crimes. The manufacturers note that in this chain,
they are six steps removed from the criminal end-users. Moreover, the fourth
link in this chain consists of acts committed by intervening third parties who
divert some handguns into an illegal market.
Camden County, 273 F.3d at 539 (citation omitted).
Construing New Jersey law as requiring "a degree of control by the defendant over
the source of the [nuisance]" alleged, the Court of Appeals found defendants to lack the
necessary control over the perpetrators of handgun violence within the county, finding
the "causal chain ... simply too attenuated to attribute sufficient control to the manufac-
turers to make out a public nuisance claim." Id. at 541.
Similarly, in the City ofPhiladelphia case the Third Circuit dismissed the action after
focusing on the lack of defendants' control over the perpetrators of the gun violence as
well as the attenuated chain of causation between the defendants and the ultimate harm
to the plaintiffs. City of Philadelphia, 277 F.3d at 425-26.
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In the first firearms case in which a court determined that munici-
pal plaintiffs had standing to sue, White v. Smith & Wesson 25 involved a
lawsuit by the mayor of the city of Cleveland, Ohio, with the city itself as
an additional party. The plaintiffs alleged, as in other cases where the
complaints were dismissed on standing grounds,26 that the firearms
industry had caused the city harm in the nature of decreased tax revenues
and increased costs for police and emergency services. The district court
recounted the plaintiffs' allegations as follows:
The City alleges that as a result of Defendants' unreasonably dan-
gerous and negligently designed handguns: the City has suffered
harm; lost substantial tax revenue due to lower productivity; and,
"has been obligated to pay millions of dollars in enhanced police
protection, emergency services, police pension benefits, court and
jail costs, and medical care." 27
The defendants in White argued that the plaintiffs' claims were
barred by what they described as the "remoteness" doctrine.28 However,
the district court noted that "no such independent doctrine exists;"
rather, the court explained that
[r]emoteness,' as the term is used in legal doctrine and in the cases
cited by Defendants, either relates to, and is merely an element of,
whether a plaintiff properly has standing to bring a claim or
whether a plaintiff has shown the existence of proximate causation
as an element of a specific claim.2 9
Treating the defendants' arguments as challenging the White plain-
tiffs' standing to bring the underlying lawsuit, the court addressed the
defendants' attempt to assert that the harm the plaintiffs alleged was too
far removed from defendants, and thus that the "injury in fact" arm of
the standing analysis was not satisfied.30 The court rejected this attempt
to bring an aspect of the "causation" arm to the injury-in-fact standing
element. "[C]ausation (i.e., who caused the injury)," the court con-
cluded, "is a prong two question in the standing analysis, and should not
be considered under prong one's question of whether there was, in fact,
an actual injury. " 3 1 After separating out injury-in-fact from causation,
the court concluded: "In the matter at hand, the City itself was injured;
an injury that has continuing, present adverse effects. Thus, the City was
injured in fact and prong one is satisfied." 32
25. 97 F. Supp. 2d 816 (N.D. Ohio 2000).
26. See, supra, n. 24.
27. Id. at 824 (citation omitted).
28. Id. at 823.
29. Id.
30. Id at 824 ("Defendants respond that Plaintiffs' injuries are not particularized
or 'injuries in fact' because their claims are too remote and derivative.").
31. Id
32. Iad at 824-25.
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Turning to causation, the court next concluded:
The injury will be fairly traceable to the challenged action if Plain-
tiffs are correct in their allegation that the handguns manufactured
by Defendants are unreasonably dangerous and negligently
designed.... Plaintiffs' claims, as alleged in their Complaint, are
the "fairly traceable" result of Defendants' actions of allegedly
designing and manufacturing unreasonably dangerous products.
33
Finally, the court found a favorable ruling by the court would likely
redress the injuries.34
The court then turned to Sixth Circuit "prudential standing restric-
tions" for a somewhat more thorough review of the plaintiffs' allega-
tions. 35 Those requirements demand that a plaintiff may not assert the
rights or interests of third parties, must be more than generalized griev-
ances, and must fall within the "zone of interests" of a particular statute,
where a cause of action is based on statutory grounds. 36
In reviewing these requirements, the court concluded that the plain-
tiffs had claimed direct harm that they themselves had suffered. Accord-
ing to the court, the drain on municipal services is a harm that the
municipality itself suffers, and is not derived from the harm that others
suffer. Moreover, the grievances were not generalized, because they were
focused on the particular harm that only the municipality had suffered
and was suffering. Finally, where the plaintiffs had raised claims under
Ohio products liability law, that law explicitly provided that government
entities were authorized claimants under the law.37
Admittedly, the White court's ruling was less detailed than Con-
necticut's Ganim decision, which denied a municipal plaintiff standing.
However, several months later, in City of Boston v. Smith & Wesson Corp.,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts engaged in a more thor-
ough analysis of the standing issues than the White court, and reached
the same conclusion-that a municipal plaintiff had standing to sue the
defendants for the alleged costs associated with the proliferation of hand-
guns in city limits.3 8
In City of Boston, the plaintiffs asserted that the activities of manu-
facturers, distributors, and sellers of firearms caused extensive harm to
the municipality. The court described these harms as follows:
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' conduct undermines the Com-
monwealth's public policy regarding handguns. Plaintiffs further
allege that Defendants' conduct has caused Plaintiffs harm,
33. Id. at 825.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d 488, 494 (6th Cir. 1999)).
37. Id. at 825-26.
38. No. 199902590, 2000 WL 1473568 (Mass. Super. July, 13, 2000).
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including substantial financial costs for prevention, amelioration
and abatement of the ongoing public nuisance caused by Defend-
ants; increased spending on law enforcement, emergency rescue
services, increased security at public schools and public buildings,
costs for coroner and funeral services for unknown victims, pen-
sions, disability, and unemployment benefits, higher prison costs
and youth intervention programs and lower tax revenues and
lower property values.
39
The plaintiffs raised a number of claims, including that the defendants
designed and manufactured their products in such a way that made it
more likely that the firearms would make it into the hands of unautho-
rized users of those firearms, including criminals and children.
40
Similar to the defendants' arguments in White, the defendants in
City of Boston challenged the plaintiffs' allegations on the grounds that
the harms alleged were too "remote" from the defendants' actions. Unlike
the White court, however, the City of Boston court analyzed the issue of
remoteness as part of the proximate cause analysis of the underlying
claims, and not as a standing inquiry, reviewing both the U.S. Supreme
Court's precedent in Holmes and the Second Circuit's ruling in Laborers
Local 17 for guidance.4 1 Citing Holmes, the court highlighted the impor-
tance of establishing "some direct relation between the injury asserted
and the injurious conduct alleged"4 2 and that the harm alleged cannot be
a result of harm to a third party; in other words, it cannot be "'purely
contingent on' or 'wholly derivative of harm to the third party."
43
Turning to an analysis under Holmes, the court distinguished cases
denying relief to health care providers for the cost of providing care to
alleged victims of a tortfeasor's conduct by characterizing the plaintiffs'
alleged harm as direct, and not dependent on some harm befalling a third
party.44 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' harm was not derivative
39. Id. at *3.
40. See id. at *1-3 (describing the plaintiffs' allegations in detail).
41. City of Boston, 2000 WL 1473568 at *4.
42. Id. at *4 (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).
43. Id. at *5 (quoting Laborers Local 17, 191 F.3d at 236, 237). The court refer-
enced the following portion of the complaint in its analysis of the plaintiffs allegations:
Defendants' conduct has caused [Plaintiffs] to incur public costs to respond to
both intentional and accidental gunshot injuries. The harm to [Plaintiffs]
includes substantial financial costs necessary for prevention, amelioration and
abatement of the ongoing public nuisance caused by [D]efendants. Moreover,
[Plaintiffs] ha[ve] suffered economic injury as a result of increased spending on,
among other things, law enforcement, emergency rescue services, increased
security at public schools and public buildings, costs for coroner and funeral
services for unknown victims, pensions, disability benefits, unemployment
benefits, higher prison costs, and youth intervention programs. Boston has fur-
ther been damaged by lower tax revenues and lower property values.
Id at *5 (alterations in original).
44. Id at "6.
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of harm suffered by others because "harm to [the] Plaintiffs may exist
even if no third party is harmed."4 5 Indeed, the plaintiffs would have to
spend greater resources on police, schools, and city streets because of the
proliferation of handguns, even if no actual injuries were caused to third
parties. The court cited the following example:
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' conduct places firearms in the
hands of juveniles causing Plaintiffs to incur increased costs to
provide more security at Boston public schools. Thus, wholly
apart from any harm to the juvenile (who may even believe him-
self to be benefited by acquisition of a firearm), and regardless
whether any firearm is actually discharged at a school, to ensure
school safety Plaintiffs sustain injury to respond to Defendants'
conduct. 4
6
Similarly, "diminished tax revenues and lower property values may
harm Plaintiffs separately from any harm inflicted on individuals."4 7 As a
result, the court concluded, the harm the plaintiffs suffered "is in essence
the type of harm typically suffered by municipalities due to public nui-
sances." 4 8 Furthermore, "much of the harm alleged is of a type that can
only be suffered by these plaintiffs."'49 As a result of these findings, the
court concluded that "remoteness" was not a barrier to the plaintiffs'
action.50
Following the City of Boston decision, litigation that the city of Cin-
cinnati had initiated reached the Ohio Supreme Court. After being dis-
missed by a trial court, a ruling that was upheld by Ohio's mid-level
appellate court, the state's highest court reinstated the action, finding,
among other things, that the plaintiffs in the action were not alleging
harm that was too remote from the allegedly tortious conduct of the
defendants. 5i There, reviewing the U.S. Supreme Court's Holmes prece-
dent and its three-part test, as the City of Boston court had also done, the
City of Cincinnati court concluded that the harms the plaintiffs alleged
were not so remote from the alleged misconduct of defendants as to bar
relief.52
45. Id
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at *7.
51. City of Cincinnati v. Beretta U.SA. Corp., 768 N.E.2d 1136 (Ohio 2002).
52. The court reviewed both the White and City of Boston decisions on this issue,
and summed up its findings on the remoteness issue as follows:
With regard to whether causation is too remote in this case, we turn to the
three factors outlined in Holmes. The first concern, difficulty of proof, is mini-
mal in this case, since appellant is seeking recovery, in part, for police expendi-
tures and property repairs, which can be easily computed. Under the second
factor, there is little risk of double recovery, since appellant is seeking recovery
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Finally, in the last case of this analysis, former Mayor Sharpe James
and the city of Newark filed suit in New Jersey state court for the munic-
ipal expenditures and losses associated with gun violence stemming from
the distribution of firearms on the black market.5 3 The appellate court in
James affirmed the trial court's ruling on several issues, including causa-
tion and standing. However, since the court in this case addressed many
of the same issues as those in the cases already discussed, and because at
least some of the James decision was premised on state law, I will not
prolong the discussion in the text here.54
for injuries to itself only. Finally, no other person is available to bring suit
against appellees for these damages. Under the third factor, Holmes asks
whether "the general interest in deterring injurious conduct" will be better
served by requiring that suit be brought by more directly injured victims.
Although appellant is indirectly attempting to protect its citizens from the
alleged misconduct by the gun manufacturers and trade associations, appellant
is seeking recovery for its own harm. Under these circumstances, the general
interest will be best served by having this plaintiff bring this lawsuit. We believe
that appellant can withstand scrutiny under the Holmes test. Consequently, we
find that the court of appeals erred in concluding that appellant's claims were
too remote for recovery.
Id. at 1149 (citations omitted) (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 269).
53. James v. Arms Tech. Inc., 820 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
54. Relying on New Jersey law on causation, which permits a plaintiff to show
proximate cause by proving a defendant's conduct was a "substantial contributing factor"
in the harm alleged, the James court found that the plaintiffs' allegations reduced the
chain of causation between the harm suffered and the conduct challenged "to a single
link." Id. at 39.
The City alleges that defendants purposely or negligently flood the gun market,
knowing that their steady supply of guns will feed or facilitate the illegal sale of
weapons to criminals and other unlawful users. Indulgently read, its allegations
further charge that defendants individually and collectively failed to develop
and in fact discourage the development of reasonable safeguards over the distri-
bution scheme, and that defendants refuse to oversee or supervise the control of
handgun distribution in order to prevent the foreseeable channeling of guns to
such an illegal market. This conduct, the City asserts, is a natural and proxi-
mate cause of its injury.
Id.
Thus, the knowing or negligent release of handguns into the illegal market is pre-
cisely the conduct that causes the drain on municipal resources. By interpreting the facts
in this way, the James court's ruling is distinguishable from the holdings in Camden
County and City of Philadelphia, discussed above, where the courts accepted the defend-
ants' description of a tortured and attenuated chain of causation between the defendants'
conduct and the harm alleged by the plaintiffs.
Similarly, adopting the approach to the facts that the City of Boston and Cincinnati
courts used, as outlined above, the James court noted that the harm the city suffered was
distinct from, and even independent of, any harm that might or might not inflicted on
third parties.
Here, the City is not alleging that it has suffered economic damages for the
medical treatment of injuries arising out of illegal gun use. The City's entire
claim is bottomed on the cost of governmental services. Those costs are entirely
distinct and separate from the medical expenses incurred in the treatment of
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2. Financial Crisis Litigation
In the wake of the financial crisis, several cities have initiated litiga-
tion against lenders and investment banks for the harm the proliferation
of their subprime mortgage products allegedly caused those cities. Just as
in the climate change and firearms litigation, cities are bearing the brunt
of the fallout from the financial crisis. Studies consistently show that
home foreclosures reduce the property values of neighboring properties. 5
This reduction brings about a lowered tax base for municipalities and
other localities. Foreclosed homes, when they stand vacant and unat-
tended, become a magnet for crime, and drain local government coffers
due to the provision of police and fire services to such properties. 56
Many cities and communities have been and will continue to be
harmed by risky lending practices carried out during the lead-up to the
financial crisis.5 7 Millions of homes have been foreclosed in the last two
years and millions more will face foreclosure before the crisis abates.
58
These foreclosures have a severe impact on the property values of both
foreclosed properties and properties near those foreclosed properties.5 9
One study of the impact of foreclosures in Chicago in 1997 and 1998
the victims of gun violence. Indeed, the City's direct expenditures in investigat-
ing a gun-related crime occurring within its jurisdiction may involve no injury
at all.
Id. at 41.
Turning to the standing issue, and recognizing that New Jersey standing doctrine is
less exacting than the federal standard, the court found that the city met its burden of
establishing it had standing to initiate the underlying action.
The City is not asserting the right of a third party; it clearly has a "sufficient
stake" in seeking redress for damages to it directly attributable to defendants'
conduct. In fact, no other party has a more direct interest in protecting the
public fisc than the City itself. Moreover, as previously noted, the expenses
incurred by the City are "direct" and independent of the costs of treating the
victims of gun violence.
Id. at 45.
55. See, e.g., DAN IMMERGLUCK & GEOFF SMITH, WOODSTOCK INST., THERE
GOES THE NEIGHBORHOOD: THE EFFECT OF SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGE FORECLO-
SURES ON PROPERTY VALUES 9 (2005), available at http://www.nw.org/foreclosuresolu-
tions/reports/documents/TGTN-Report.pdf (studying foreclosures in the City of
Chicago in the 1990s and finding that each foreclosure reduced the property values of all
residences within one-eighth of a mile by approximately 1% for each foreclosure).
56. WILLIAM C. APGAR ET AL., THE MUNICIPAL COST OF FORECLOSURES: A
CHICAGO CASE STUDY 10-11 (2005), available at http://www.995hope.org/content/pdf/
Apgar-Duda StudyFullVersion.pdf.
57. WILLIAM C. APGAR & MARK DUDA, COLLATERAL DAMAGE: THE MUNICIPAL
IMPACT OF TODAY'S MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BOOM 7 (2005), available at http://
www.995hope.org/content/pdf/ApgarDudaStudy-Short_Version.pdf.
58. Janet Morrissey, Still Hunting for a Bottom in Housing, TIME, Jan. 7, 2010,
available at http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1952132,00.html.
59. See Eric C. Seitz, U.S. Subprime Crisis: HR. 3915-A Far-Sighted Solution to
the Mortgage Crisis, 14 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 759, 764 (2008) (citing Luke Mullins,
Nightmare on Main Street, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 10, 2008, at 42) (explaining
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showed that the property values of homes dropped approximately 1%
each for all single-family homes within one-eighth of a mile of a fore-
closed property,60 and that on average, each foreclosed property
decreased the aggregate value of neighboring properties between
$159,000 and $371,000.61 The study estimated that the foreclosures
reduced property values in the city as a whole by between $598 million
and $1.39 billion.62 More recent studies predict a range of cumulative
losses to homeowners nationally at between $356 billion and $1.2 tril-
lion in home values as a result of the present foreclosure crisis.63 How-
ever, because different regions face different foreclosure rates-with the
most alarming occurring in California, Florida, Nevada, Ohio, and Ari-
zona-certain communities are more affected than others.
64
With these losses in mind, cities have begun to initiate lawsuits, but
they have had limited success to date. Litigation in this arena has come in
three different forms. First, in January 2008, the mayor and city council
of Baltimore, Maryland, brought suit against lender Wells Fargo for what
the plaintiffs alleged are violations of the Fair Housing Act evident in the
bank's lending patterns in the city.65 Second, the city of Cleveland,
Ohio, commenced an action against well over a dozen investment banks
under the theory that those financial institutions promoted the sale of
subprime mortgage products with the full knowledge that those loans
that foreclosed properties are often sold at less than market value, which typically reduces
the appraised valuation neighboring properties).
60. DAN IMMERGLUCK & GEOFF SMITH, WOODSTOCK INST., THERE GoEs THE
NEIGHBORHOOD: THE EFFECT OF SINGLE-FAMILY MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES ON
PROPERTY VALUES 9 (2005), available at http:// www.nw.org/foreclosuresolutions/
reports/documents/TGTNReport.pd.
61. Id. at 11.
62. Id. at 13.
63. Compare THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM:
STATES RESPOND TO AMERICA'S FORECLOSURE CRISIS 10 ex. 1 (2008), available at
http://wwwpewtrusts. org/uploadedFiles / wwwpewtrustsorg / Reports / Subprime- mort-
gages/defaulting-on-the..dream.pdf (predicting a $356 billion loss in home value due to
rise in foreclosures), with GLOBAL INSIGHT, THE MORTGAGE CRISIS: ECONOMIC AND
FISCAL IMPLICATIONS FOR METRO AREAS 2 (2007), available at http://www.usmayors.
org/metroeconomies/1 107/report.pdf (predicting a $1.2 trillion total loss in home values
due to the subprime mortgage crisis).
64. See Gregory D. Squires, Urban Development and Unequal Access to Housing
Finance Services, 53 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 255, 263 (2008) (citing David Cho & Nell
Henderson, Where the Wolf Comes Knocking; Areas Already in Economic Distress Feel Rise in
Housing Foreclosures Most, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2007, at Dl) ("[M]acro-economic
effects are harshest in depressed communities, particularly the Gulf Coast and industrial
Midwest. Subprime foreclosure rates in the fourth quarter of 2006 ranged from less than
3% in Washington, D.C., Maryland, and Virginia, to over 7% in Mississippi, and over
9% in Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio.").
65. For an overview of the Baltimore litigation, see Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime
Communities: Reverse Redlining the Fair Housing Act and Emerging Issues in Litigation
Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV'T L. REv. 164, 175-79 (2009).
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were risky and likely to cause harm where they were sold.66 Third, Buf-
falo, New York,6 7 and Cincinnati, Ohio,6" have commenced litigation
for the failure of banks, once they foreclose on properties, to maintain
those properties, causing a drain on municipal resources.
While the Buffalo and Cincinnati cases have not progressed very far,
both the Baltimore and Cleveland cases have been dismissed. In Cleve-
land, Federal District Court Judge Sara Lioi dismissed that city's case,
finding that an Ohio law prohibited municipalities from regulating mort-
gages. Because the city's commencement of the litigation was itself an
effort to regulate mortgages, the court concluded, it was barred by the
statute.69 The city is appealing this decision; the following discussion
assesses that portion of the trial court's decision that was related to
standing.
The Cleveland litigation, one of the first of its type, targets a host of
investment banks including some of the nation's largest, like Goldman
Sachs & Co. and JP Morgan's mortgage-backed securities arm. The city
is seeking to recoup both the costs of responding to crime and other
emergencies caused by foreclosed properties that had been saddled with
subprime mortgage debt, and the concomitant drop in the tax base that
these foreclosures caused.7" It claims that while the investment banks did
not make the subprime loans themselves, they built up a market for
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) fed by subprime loans. This market
environment was inappropriate for Cleveland given the weakness of its
economy, the city claims, and it was foreseeable that many of these mort-
gages would fall into arrears and ultimately end up in foreclosure. 7'
The defendants in the action raised many of the same arguments
used in the firearms litigation described above, including that state law
66. Ameriquest Mortgage Sec., 621 F. Supp.2d at 514-515 (describing allegations of
complaint).
67. See Jason Szep, Cities Grapple with Surge in Abandoned Homes, REUTERS, Mar.
25, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/marketsNews/idUSN 1162941020
080325 (describing how Buffalo filed suit against lenders holding foreclosed properties
for the costs of maintenance and/or demolition of such properties).
68. Dan Monk, City Sues Deutsche Bank, Wells Fargo, Bus. COURIER (CINCIN-
NATI), Dec. 24, 2008, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/stories/2008/
12/22/daily45.html (describing Cincinnati action).
69. See Ameriquest Mortgage Sec., 621 F. Supp. 2d at 518-20 (granting dismissal
of complaint). Additional grounds for dismissal included that the action was barred by
the economic loss rule; that the City's allegations "fail[ed] to demonstrate an unreasona-
ble interference with a public right"; and that the city was unable to demonstrate "that
Defendants' conduct was the proximate cause of its alleged damages." Id. at 536. Since
this action was unique among the municipal litigation currently pending, it is unclear
whether this decision, if not reversed on appeal, will have any impact on the other pend-
ing actions, though it will likely discourage other municipalities within Ohio from bring-
ing actions based on similar allegations.
70. Id. at 515-16.
71. Id. at 515-17 (summarizing the city's allegations).
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preempted the city's litigation, that lawful conduct cannot create a public
nuisance, and that the city's harms were too remote from the defendants'
actions for those actions to have proximately caused those harms.
7 2
Although the district court found several bases upon which to dismiss the
city's action, I will focus only on the proximate cause issue here.
Relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Holmes, the court
assessed the defendants' alleged misconduct to determine whether it was
the proximate cause of the plaintiffs harms or whether there were "too
many independent events and potential intervening causes lying in
between,"73 as the defendants asserted, defeating the claim. The court
then outlined what it described as a "lengthy chain of events" between
the plaintiffs harms and the defendants' conduct.7 4 The court described
the defendants as "stand[ing] atop" this chain of events, "far removed
from the City's ultimate damages."
75
The court then recounted the course of conduct that led to the
harms the city alleged it suffered, starting with the defendants providing
funding for MBS, which itself provided the funds necessary to capitalize
subprime lenders so that they could make subprime loans.7 6 Mortgage
brokers then partnered with subprime mortgage originators to make sub-
prime loans. These mortgages were packaged and sold to the defendants,
who, in turn, sold them as securities on the securitization market. Bor-
rowers then defaulted on the loans.7 7 Any property securing such a mort-
gage was foreclosed upon (usually not by the defendants), the property
fell into disrepair, and "it eventually became an eyesore, a fire hazard, or
otherwise deteriorated in condition to such a degree that the City was
required to incur costs either maintaining the property or demolishing
it."7 8 The court then summed up its assessment of this chain of events as
follows:
72. Ameriquest Mortgage Sec., 621 F. Supp.2d at 516.
73. Id. at 532.
74. Id. at 534.
75. Id
76. Id.
77. The court outlined the likely intervening factors that might have caused the
borrower to fall into arrears on his or her mortgage as follows:
This occurred for any number of reasons. For example, the borrower may have
lost a job, kept a job but did not have the wherewithal to repay in the first
place, suffered a catastrophic injury, borrowed too much on credit cards, been
unable to refinance the original loan, taken out a second mortgage that the
borrower was unable to afford, suffered investment losses that depleted savings
that were to be used to repay the mortgage, or, despite an ability to pay, simply
decided to walk away from the mortgage because the expense was not justified
by the property's declining value-all of which the [city] conveniently ignores.
Id.
78. Id
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This confluence of events certainly was no small problem given
the large volume of foreclosures in Cleveland and the city's budg-
etary constraints, but under no circumstances can it be described
as having been directly caused by Defendants' conduct. As the
foregoing discussion illustrates, the potential number of interven-
ing causes borders on incalculable. 79
The court went on to distinguish the City of Cincinnati firearms
decision of the Ohio Supreme Court, described above, by saying that
"the guns that comprised the illegal firearms market [in that case]
originated with the defendant gun manufacturers, while in this case,
Defendants did not originate the underlying subprime loans or initiate
foreclosures in Cleveland, but merely provided funding for subprime
lending. 8
0
Furthermore, the court noted that in the firearms context the harm
to the city-for example, the cost of policing in a city as a result of an
increase in illegal firearms-could arise "irrespective of whether third-
parties [sic] were actually injured by gun violence."'" In contrast, the
city's claim in the subprime mortgage context "hinges entirely on the
foreclosure activity for which Defendants were at best indirectly responsi-
ble." 82 The court went on to conclude that the city could not claim that
"it was injured by the mere issuance of subprime loans or MBS."8 3 The
court also concluded that other parties-including subprime borrowers
and investors in MBS-would likely be better plaintiffs in an action
against investment banks than the city, because they were more closely
linked to those banks' activities. 8 Based on this three-part Holmes analy-
sis, the court ultimately concluded that the city could not establish the
requisite proximate cause to maintain the suit.85
Following the decision in the Cleveland case, a district court in Ala-
bama dismissed for lack of standing a case the city of Birmingham filed
79. Id
80. Id. at 536.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 533.
85. The court concluded as follows:
The City's allegations fail to demonstrate any direct relationship between its
alleged injury and Defendants' conduct. It would be tremendously difficult, if
not completely impossible, to determine which of the City's damages are
attributable to Defendants' alleged misconduct and not to some absent party.
In addition, even if Defendants' securitization activities were somehow unlaw-
ful, subprime borrowers and MBS investors stand in closer proximity to
Defendants' conduct and have potential claims and remedies available to vindi-
cate their legal rights.
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under the Fair Housing Act and state common law tort theories.8 6 The
court concluded that that harms alleged were too remote and attenuated
from the defendants' conduct, which, it was alleged, constituted "reverse
redlining"-i.e., the targeting of communities of color for loans on terms
less favorable than loans a lender would make to whites.8
7
In its dismissal the court did find, however, that the plaintiffs could
at least meet the first prong of the standing test: injury-in-fact. Recount-
ing the city's allegations, the court wrote:
The City alleges that it has suffered, inter alia, the following "inju-
ries in fact": reduced property values, reduced property tax reve-
nues, increased spending on police and fire protection, and
increased spending to secure foreclosed homes that are abandoned.
The court finds that, assuming the factual allegations in the com-
plaint are true, the City's alleged financial injuries constitute
"injuries in fact" for the purpose of determining standing.8 8
The court found, however, citing the Supreme Court's precedent in
Lujan, that the plaintiffs could not meet the second prong of the stand-
ing inquiry-specifically that their harms were "fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent
action of some third party not before the court."8 9 Admitting that this
analysis is "something like a moving target,"9 ' the court turned to prece-
dent from a district court in North Carolina, Tingley v. Beazer Homes
Corp., where the court dismissed an action by homeowners against lend-
ers who had made predatory loans to third-party borrowers who then
defaulted on their loans, causing the reduction in the plaintiff-homeown-
ers' property values. 91 The court in that case found the plaintiffs' harms
wanting because the third-party, defaulting mortgagors could have
defaulted for any number of reasons, not just that the loans were unfair.
Accordingly, the homeowners' harms were not fairly traceable to defend-
ants' conduct or free of the intervening acts of third parties not before
the court.92 Following this precedent, the court in Birmingham con-
cluded that the city's claims were actually more attenuated than the
claims of the homeowners in Tingley, and thus they could not establish a
"fairly traceable" link between the defendants' conduct and the harm the
city suffered. 93
86. City of Birmingham v. Citigroup, CV-09-BE-467-S, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
123123 (N.D. AL Aug. 19, 2009).
87. Id. at *11-12.
88. Id. at *8.
89. Id. (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560).
90. Id. at *9.
91. Tingley v. Beazer Homes Corp., No. 3:07cvl7 6 , 2008 WL 1902108
(W.D.N.C. April 25, 2008).
92. Id. at *4.
93. The court concluded as follows:
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Similarly, and most recently, a district court judge dismissed a law-
suit filed by the mayor and city council of Baltimore against Wells Fargo
bank and its affiliates under the Fair Housing Act on the grounds that
the plaintiffs' claims that they suffered cognizable harms at the hands of
the defendants were not "plausible" in accordance with recent Supreme
Court precedents.94 My research indicates that this is the first case out of
the thousands of cases that have cited these precedents to dismiss a case
on standing grounds using the "plausibility standard" of these holdings.
In Mayor of Baltimore, the judge first assigned the case denied the
bank's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had presented evi-
dence of direct discrimination, 95 which meant the case should go for-
ward. However, Federal District Court Judge Frederick Motz, to whom
the case was later re-assigned, subsequently found that the plaintiffs had
presented scant evidence that the properties secured by loans originated
by the defendants were more than a "negligible portion" of the city's
vacant housing stock.
Thus, using the City's own figures, Wells Fargo is responsible for
only a negligible portion of the City's vacant housing stock. This
fact alone demonstrates the implausibility of any alleged causal
connection between Wells Fargo's alleged reverse redlining activi-
ties and the generalized type of damages claimed by the City, e.g.,
decline in value of homes and decreased property tax revenues
resulting, increased criminal and gang activities, and increased
police and fire protection resulting from building vacancies. More-
over, the alleged connection is even more implausible when con-
Just as in Tingley, a series of speculative inferences must be drawn to connect
the injuries asserted with the alleged wrongful conduct by the Defendants. Like
in that case, the minority borrowers in this case could have defaulted on their
mortgages for a number of reasons, none of which related to the Defendants'
alleged "reverse redlining." Also, the Defendants' decisions to foreclose on the
properties after the borrowers defaulted could be, as in Tingley, for reasons
totally apart from the alleged "reverse redlining." Furthermore, it is quite spec-
ulative that the depreciation in value of the neighboring homes in the City was
caused by the foreclosures of minority borrowers' properties rather than as a
result of "a myriad of other factors," which, as the Tingley court noted, could
include "rising unemployment in the region, changes in the housing market, or
other economic conditions."
City of Birmingham, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123123, at *12-13 (quoting Tingley, 2008
WL 1902108, at *5).
94. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo, N.A., 677 F. Supp. 2d
847 (D. Md. 2010). For the recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on pleading require-
ments, see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (requiring that allega-
tions of a complaint meet a threshold of "plausibility" in order to satisfy Rule 8 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) (requir-
ing the same).
95. Mayor of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 631 F. Supp. 2d 702, 704 (D.
Md 2009).
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sidered against the background of other factors leading to the
deterioration of the inner city, such as extensive unemployment,
lack of educational opportunity and choice, irresponsible parent-
ing, disrespect for the law, widespread drug use, and violence....
It may be entirely reasonable to posit-as the City's allegations
amply support-that unscrupulous lenders took advantage of
inner city [sic] residents living in a dysfunctional environment to
induce them to make loans they could not afford. It does not
follow, however, that it is reasonable to infer-as the City
argues-that the unscrupulous lenders themselves created the dys-
functional environment they exploited.96
The court invited plaintiffs to submit an amended complaint.9 7
While these cases still may succeed after amendment of the plead-
ings, as in the Baltimore case, or after appeal, as in the case filed by the
city of Cleveland, to date municipal litigation in the wake of the financial
crisis has yet to achieve any lasting victories in the courts. On the envi-
ronmental front, however, government litigants, including municipalities
in some instances, have had greater success, particularly on the standing
issue. It is to this area of law that I now turn.
3. Climate Change Litigation
The third area of potential municipal litigation, one that is only
likely to expand in coming years, involves lawsuits to combat the harmful
effects of global climate change. Unlike in the firearms and financial crisis
settings, however, there is a Supreme Court pronouncement on the spe-
cific issue of government entity standing. Moreover, in that pronounce-
ment, Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court found Massachusetts suitable as
the action's lead plaintiff not just because it was a state, but also because
it was a property owner with property allegedly affected by rising sea
tides due to climate change.98 What makes the case even more likely to
expand standing doctrine is both the extent to which the chain of causa-
tion involved there appears attenuated, and the somewhat tenuous poten-
tial for redressability-neither of which prevented the Court from
finding standing.
In Massachusetts, the state and several other plaintiffs sought to com-
pel the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to determine
whether it needed to promulgate regulations of so-called greenhouse gas
emissions under the Clean Air Act (CAA).99 The plaintiffs alleged that
the EPA's failure first, to make a determination on whether it needed to
96. Mayor of Baltimore, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 850-51 (footnote and citation
omitted).
97. Id. at *4.
98. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007).
99. Id at 505.
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regulate these gases, and second, actually to regulate those gases assuming
the agency found it needed to do so, contributed to global warming and
endangered the Massachusetts coastline. ° ° Massachusetts sought relief
both as a state and as a landowner of seaside properties likely affected by
rising tides due to global warming. 1 Under the CAA, the EPA can issue
regulations concerning control of "air pollutants."'0 2 Because the EPA
had chosen not to make a determination as to whether greenhouse gases
were air pollutants, it would not issue rules regulating such gases,
10 3
despite the plaintiffs' request that the EPA do just that.'0 4
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens noted that Congress had
authorized the type of suit in question: a litigant challenging the EPA's
failure to issue regulations under the CAA with respect to a particular
pollutant.10 5 Quoting Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan at
length, the majority opinion reviewed the broad power Congress pos-
sesses to confer standing in many situations:
"Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of
causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where none
existed before. In exercising this power, however, Congress must at
the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the
injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit." We will not,
therefore, "entertain citizen suits to vindicate the public's noncon-
crete interest in the proper administration of the laws.'
0 6
While the majority recited the Lujan standing elements of actual or
imminent injury, traceable to the defendant and redressable by the
court,'0 7 the opinion stressed:
[A] litigant to whom Congress has "accorded a procedural right to
protect his concrete interests"-here, the right to challenge agency
action unlawfully withheld-"can assert that right without meet-
ing all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy."
When a litigant is vested with a procedural right, that litigant has
standing if there is some possibility that the requested relief will
100. Id.
101. Id. at 515 (quoting Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 65-66 (D.C. Cit.
2005) (Tatel, J., dissenting), rev'd, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)).
102. Id. at 528 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)).
103. Id. at 513-14 (citing Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and
Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,930-33 (Sept. 8, 2003)).
104. Id. at 510.
105. Id. at 516.
106. Id. at 516-17 (citations omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580-81 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
107. Id. at 517 (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61).
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prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider the decision that
allegedly harmed the litigant.
10 8
The majority went on to recognize that Massachusetts met the injury-in-
fact element. Because the Commonwealth owned "'a substantial portion
of the state's coastal property,'" it had "alleged a particularized injury in
its capacity as a landowner."' 0 9
Turning to causation, the Court noted that the EPA did not argue
that there is no causal connection between greenhouse gas emissions and
global warming, but instead that the particular relief sought-to have the
EPA review such gases as pollutants and consider specifically whether to
issue regulations about new vehicles' emission of the gases-contributed
"insignificantly" to the harms plaintiffs were alleging."' The Court
rejected the EPA's contentions, however, indicating that even "a small
incremental step" to mitigate an injury gives rise to judicial review."1 '
Finally, with respect to redressability, the Court noted that even with
expected increases in global emissions from other parts of the world, a
"reduction in domestic emissions [of greenhouse gases] would slow the
pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere."
1 12
Admittedly, the Court did note the "special position and interest of
Massachusetts" and the "considerable relevance" to the standing discus-
sion of the fact that the party seeking review was a sovereign state. 1 3 As a
result, the state was entitled to "special solicitude" in the standing analy-
sis." 4 At the same time, the Court noted that Massachusetts owned "a
great deal" of the coastline affected by greenhouse gas emissions and this
fact "only reinforces the conclusion that [the state's] stake in the outcome
of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal judi-
cial power." 1 5 Perhaps because of the fact that the state is also a land-
owner, the Court concluded, "it is clear that petitioners' submissions as
they pertain to Massachusetts have satisfied the most demanding stan-
dards of the adversarial process."116 This language, all taken together,
seems to indicate that while the Court believed that a lower showing was
required of the state to establish standing, Massachusetts nevertheless had
shown that it owned property affected by the challenged action such that
the "most demanding" standing test could also be met.
108. Id. at 517-18 (citations omitted) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7) (cit-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2006)).
109. Id. at 522.
110. Id. at 523.
111. Id. at 524.
112. Id. at 526.
113. Id. at 518.
114. Id. at 520.
115. Id. at 519.
116. Id. at 521.
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The literal ruling of the Court was that a state can bring such a
challenge, but that does not end the discussion. In Massachusetts, the
Court addressed, at least nominally, "procedural harms" and the power
of Congress to confer standing to challenge agency action that causes
such harms.' 1 7 The Court has also recognized this power in other opin-
ions.118 Even Justice Scalia recognized Congress's power to confer stand-
ing based on such harms in Lujan, where the Court otherwise rejected
the standing of individual plaintiffs who failed to allege they suffered
specific harm from agency policies and inaction.' 19
A key aspect of the Massachusetts ruling is that the plaintiffs were
seeking to vindicate a state's procedural rights. Because of these two ele-
ments-the nature of the claim and the litigant-it is possible to con-
sider the Court's ruling as limited to situations where similar claims and
parties are present. At the same time, the Court assessed the standing of
the plaintiff state suing in its capacity as a landowner, and noted that the
nature of the injuries and the relief sought were such that the Common-
wealth met the most exacting requirements of standing. Nowhere did the
Court indicate that its causation and redressability findings were limited
117. For a discussion of procedural harms giving rise to standing, see Zachary D.
Sakas, Footnotes, Forests, and Fallacy: An Examination of the Circuit Split Regarding Stand-
ing in Procedural Injury-Based Programmatic Challenges, 13 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 175,
176 (2006) (discussing procedural injury cases and exploring a circuit split over whether a
programmatic rule, rather than a "site-specific agency rule," provides plaintiff's standing
in procedural injury cases); Christopher T. Burt, Comment, Procedural Injury Standing
After Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 275, 277 & n.7 (1995) (explor-
ing the different methods courts have used in analyzing procedural injury standing, not-
ing possible methods that courts could use and evaluating these methods while
considering the effects of Lujan); Miriam S. Wolok, Note, Standing for Environmental
Groups: Procedural Injury as Injury-in-Fact, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 163, 164 (1992)
(reviewing the development and application of procedural injury to create standing for
environmental groups (citing Defenders of Wildlife v. Lujan, 911 F.2d 117 (8th Cit.
1990), rev'd, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 555)).
118. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) ("Congress may grant an
express right of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential standing
rules.").
119. Writing for the Court in Lujan, Justice Scalia recognized the viability of a
plaintiffs standing to sue for procedural harm, provided that there is still some concrete
injury flowing from that harm, like owning property adjacent to the land affected by the
disputed agency conduct:
There is this much truth to the assertion that "procedural rights" are special:
The person who has been accorded a procedural right to protect his concrete
interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal standards for
redressability and immediacy. Thus, under our case law, one living adjacent to
the site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to
challenge the licensing agency's failure to prepare an environmental impact
statement, even though he cannot establish with any certainty that the state-
ment will cause the license to be withheld or altered, and even though the dam
will not be completed for many years.
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n.7.
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to cases involving a state as litigant, or to cases involving solely procedu-
ral harms. It is not a surprise then that litigants have attempted to apply
this precedent to other settings. Most notably, in decisions reached
within less than a month of each other in the fall of 2009, both the
Second and Fifth Circuits ruled independently that the standing analysis
in Massachusetts could be applied to both state 20 and private litigants' 2 '
suing under common law theories. I will next discuss each of these deci-
sions in turn.
First, in 2004, eight states and the city of New York brought a pub-
lic nuisance action against six power companies, alleging violations of
federal common law, or, in the alternative, state law. 1 22 The plaintiffs
alleged that the defendants were responsible for "'ten percent of all car-
bon dioxide emissions from human activities in the United States.' ' '123
The plaintiffs alleged that one of the states-California-was already
experiencing the impacts of global warming due to increased snowpack
melt in the Sierra Nevada Mountains resulting from increased average
temperatures, pushed back fall freezes, and moved-up spring thaws. 124
In addition to this suit, a group of land trusts filed a companion
action against the same defendants, alleging that the lands they hold in
trust are in danger from global warming. Specifically, they claimed "that
the accelerated sea level rise and coastal storm surges caused by global
120. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. Inc., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009)
(finding that states had standing to bring federal common law nuisance claims related to
defendant-power companies' alleged contributions to global warming).
121. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cit. 2009) (finding that
private parties had standing to bring state common law nuisance claims against oil and
energy companies for their contributions to global warming, which allegedly made Hurri-
cane Katrina more powerful and destructive).
122. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 314.
123. Id. at 316 (citation omitted).
124. Id. at 317. In terms of future and threatened injuries, the court described the
plaintiffs' allegations as follows:
With regard to future injuries, the complaint categorizes in detail a range of
injuries the States expect will befall them within a span of 10 to 100 years if
global warming is not abated. Among the injuries they predict are: increased
illnesses and deaths caused by intensified and prolonged heat waves; increased
smog, with a concomitant increase in residents' respiratory problems; signifi-
cant beach erosion; accelerated sea level rise and the subsequent inundation of
coastal land and damage to coastal infrastructure; salinization of marshes and
water supplies; lowered Great Lakes water levels, and impaired shipping, recrea-
tional use, and hydropower generation; more droughts and floods, resulting in
property damage; increased wildfires, particularly in California; and the wide-
spread disruption of ecosystems, which would seriously harm hardwood forests
and reduce biodiversity. The States claim that the impact on property, ecology,
and public health from these injuries will cause extensive economic harm.
Id. at 317-18.
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warming would permanently inundate some of their property, salinizing
marshes and destroying wildlife habitat."
125
The defendants challenged the plaintiffs' claims in these actions on
several grounds, including that there was no federal common law cause of
action to abate the emission of greenhouse gases, and that the plaintiffs
lacked standing. The district court, Chief Judge Loretta Preska of the
Southern District presiding, dismissed the actions on the ground that the
complaints raised political questions that were not justiciable, finding
that the issues the litigation presented were "transcendently legislative
[in] nature." 126 Having dismissed the matter as incapable of judicial reso-
lution, the lower court did not reach the standing issue.
On appeal, the Second Circuit addressed both the justiciability of
the plaintiffs' claims and the plaintiffs' standing to sue. Rejecting the
district court's conclusion on justiciability, the appellate court found that
courts routinely handle "familiar public nuisance precepts, grapple[]
with complex scientific evidence, and resolve[ ] the issues presented,
based on a fully developed record." 127 As a result, the issues the plaintiffs
presented were not beyond judicial expertise or power. The court next
turned to the issue of standing.
The court noted that the states were suing both in their parens
patriae and proprietary capacities (i.e., as owners of property), and New
York City and the land trusts were suing in their proprietary capacities as
well.' 2 8 Turning first to the states' parens patriae standing, the court
recounted the Supreme Court's standard, articulated in Alfed L. Snapp &
Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez,1 29 which requires states to make the
following showing: that they are articulating an interest separate from
particular private parties; that they are asserting claims as quasi-sover-
eigns; and that they have alleged an injury to a sufficiently substantial
segment of a state's population.1 3 With this standard in mind, the court
had no difficulty finding that the states had standing in their parens
patriae capacity.1
3 1
125. Id. at 318.
126. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
127. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 327 (citation omitted).
128. Id. at 334.
129. 458 U.S. 592 (1982).
130. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 335-36 (citations omitted). The American Elec-
tric court also highlighted the fact that the Second Circuit adds an additional requirement
in such settings-specifically that individuals on whose behalf a state is suing cannot
obtain complete relief through a private suit. Id. at 336 (citation omitted).
131. The Second Circuit found as follows:
Their interest in safeguarding the public health and their resources is an inter-
est apart from any interest held by individual private entities. Their quasi-sov-
ereign interests involving their concern for the "health and well-being-both
physical and economic-of [their] residents in general," are classic examples of a
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With respect to the standing of the states, New York City, and the
land trusts in their proprietary capacities, the court next relied on the
Lujan factors. It turned first to the injury-in-fact requirement, and sepa-
rated out those injuries the plaintiffs alleged they currently experienced
from those injuries threatened in the future. Addressing the present inju-
ries the state of California alleged-injuries resulting from melting
snowpack-the court found those injuries to be concrete, particularized,
actual and imminent, and not conjectural or hypothetical. In other
words, they satisfied the injury-in-fact requirement. 132
The land trusts' claims were equally wide-ranging, including allega-
tions that rising sea levels will inundate coastal lands they hold in trust,
and that the salinization of marshes on their properties will destroy fish
and migratory bird habitats. 133 The groups also alleged harm not only to
their proprietary interests but also their organizational goals:
[The land trusts] assert that global warming "will diminish or
destroy the particular ecological and aesthetic values that caused
[them] to acquire, and cause them to maintain, the properties they
hold in trust," and will undermine their objectives by "interfering
with their efforts to preserve ecologically significant and sensitive
state's quasi-sovereign interest. The States have alleged that the injuries result-
ing from carbon dioxide emissions will affect virtually their entire populations.
Moreover, it is doubtful that individual plaintiffs filing a private suit could
achieve complete relief.
Id. at 338 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
132. Id. at 341-42. In terms of the future injuries alleged by the state and city
plaintiffs, it was extensive, and described by the court as follows:
The bulk of the States' allegations concern future injury. For example, those
Plaintiff States with ocean coastlines, including New York City, charge that a
rise in sea level induced by global warming will cause more frequent and severe
flooding, harm coastal infrastructure including airports, subway stations, tun-
nels, tunnel vent shafts, storm sewers, wastewater treatment plants, and
bridges, and cause hundreds of billions of dollars of damage. In addition, they
assert that some low-lying public property would be permanently inundated
unless protective structures are built, with the cost falling heavily on those
coastal Plaintiffs. Further, a rise in sea level would salinize marshes and tide-
lands, destroy habitat for commercial and game species, migratory birds, and
other wildlife; accelerate beach erosion, and cause saltwater intrusion into
groundwater aquifers. Global warming threatens Plaintiff States bordering the
Great Lakes with substantial injury by lowering the water levels of the Great
Lakes, which would disrupt hydropower production. Warmer temperatures
would threaten agriculture in Iowa and Wisconsin and increase the frequency
and duration of summer heat waves with concomitant crop risk. Global warm-
ing will also disrupt ecosystems by negatively affecting State-owned hardwood
forests and fish habitats, and substantially increase the damage in California
due to wildfires. Plaintiff States predict these injuries will come to pass in the
next 10 to 100 years.
Id. at 342.
133. Id.
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land for scientific and educational purposes, and for human use
and enjoyment. "134
The court then addressed defendants' objections that the plaintiffs'
harms were not imminent because plaintiffs could not specify a date cer-
tain by which such harms would occur. 135 The Second Circuit then
reviewed precedent from the Supreme Court, 136 as well as the Seventh
Circuit' 37 and its own precedent, 138 to conclude that the "imminence" of
an injury was not related to temporal specificity as to when it would
occur, but rather the certainty that the alleged harms would occur at all.
The court turned to its prior decision in Baur v. Veneman, where it found
that a plaintiffs risk of exposure to illness due to the defendants' conduct
was the harm that gave rise to that party's standing, not contracting the
illness itself. There, the Second Circuit found that "'only the exposure
must be imminent, not the actual onset of disease."' 39 The court, in turn,
found that the facts before it were more compelling than the facts in
Baur, because the defendants were "currently emitting large amounts of
carbon dioxide and will continue to do so in the future," and "the
processes producing [the harms] have already begun." 140
Turning to the causation element of the standing inquiry, the court
rejected the defendants' contentions that because there were many other
causes and potential causes of the plaintiffs' alleged injuries, and because
the plaintiffs could not pinpoint which injuries the defendants caused,
the plaintiffs could not satisfy this prong of the standing analysis. Indeed,
the defendants argued that the emissions "allegedly account for 2.5% of
man-made carbon dioxide emissions," and "only the collective effect of
worldwide emissions allegedly causes injury." 4 ' The court dispensed
with this objection, however, finding as follows:
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that their current and future
injuries are "fairly traceable" to Defendants' conduct. For purposes
of Article III standing they are not required to pinpoint which
specific harms of the many injuries they assert are caused by par-
ticular Defendants, nor are they required to show that Defendants'
emissions alone cause their injuries. It is sufficient that they allege
that Defendants' emissions contribute to their injuries.' 4 2
134. Id. at 342 (alteration in the original) (quoting Complaint at 29-30, Am. Elec.
Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265).
135. Id. at 342-43.
136. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564, n.2.
137. 520 S. Michigan Ave. Assocs. Ltd. v. Devine, 433 F.3d 961 (7th Cir. 2006).
138. Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625 (2d. Cir. 2003).
139. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 344 (citing Baur, 352 F.3d at 641).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 347.
142. Id.
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With respect to redressability, the court turned again to the
Supreme Court's precedent in Massachusetts to counter defendants' argu-
ments that even if the court were to intervene on behalf of the plaintiffs,
global warming will continue due to the actions of entities beyond the
reach of the court's remedial powers. Turning to that precedent, the Sec-
ond Circuit noted that the Court there recognized that remedies that
could "slow or reduce" global warming were sufficient to satisfy the
redressability prong of the standing test.143 Ultimately, the court
endorsed the plaintiffs' position that "[e]ven if emissions increase else-
where, the magnitude of Plaintiffs' injuries will be less if Defendants'
emissions are reduced than they would be without a remedy," thereby
rejecting defendants' objections and accepting the plaintiffs' arguments
that they met the "redressability" prong of the standing inquiry. 1"
Less than a month after this Second Circuit ruling, the Fifth Circuit
joined the wave of courts endorsing the standing of litigants bringing
climate change-related lawsuits. It found that property owners along the
Mississippi Gulf Coast could proceed in their suit against oil and energy
companies whose emissions, it is alleged, contributed to the ferocity of
Hurricane Katrina, causing damage to those property owners' lands. 14 5
There, the plaintiffs had sought claims for compensatory and punitive
damages against the defendant-companies on a number of theories,
including state common law theories of nuisance, trespass, and negli-
gence, among others. 14
6
In the now-familiar pattern of such cases, the defendants challenged
the plaintiffs' standing. However, the court found that since these plain-
tiffs were landowners who suffered concrete harms to their property, and
that damages awards would compensate them for such harms, they easily
satisfied the first and third prongs of the Article III standing require-
ment. 4 7 Indeed, the defendants did not even challenge the plaintiffs'
ability to satisfy these elements of the test, but instead chose to focus on
143. Paraphrasing that precedent, the Second Circuit explained its import as
follows:
In other words, that courts could provide some measure of relief would suffice
to show redressability, and the proposed remedy need not address or prevent all
harm from a variety of other sources. Moreover, the Court observed that
although EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions might not reverse global
warming, in light of the fact that China and India were "poised to increase
greenhouse gas emissions substantially over the next century," the remedy
sought-reduction of domestic emissions-"would slow the pace of global
emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere."
Id. at 348-49 (quoting Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525-26).
144. Id at 349.
145. Comer, 585 F.3d 855.
146. Id. at 859-60.
147. Id at 863--64. The court had already found that the plaintiffs had satisfied
Mississippi's more liberal standing requirement. Id. at 862.
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whether the harms alleged were traceable to the defendants' conduct.
The court summarized the defendants' arguments as follows: "Essen-
tially, they argue that traceability is lacking because: (1) the causal link
between emissions, sea level rise, and Hurricane Katrina is too attenu-
ated, and (2) the defendants' actions are only one of many contributions
to greenhouse gas emissions, thereby foreclosing traceability." 4 '
The court rejected the defendants' arguments, stating that the
Supreme Court had already "accepted as plausible the link between man-
made greenhouse gas emissions and global warming."149 Moreover, the
court accepted the landowners' arguments because the Comer plaintiffs
were alleging a chain of causation that was one link shorter than the
chain described in Massachusetts, which the Supreme Court had endorsed
as satisfying the redressability prong. 150 Finally, the court found that
since the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants contributed to the harms
the plaintiffs suffered, those allegations were sufficient to satisfy the trace-
ability prong of the standing analysis. Once again, the Fifth Circuit relied
on the Supreme Court's precedent in Massachusetts for this point.
1 5 1
Although the court ultimately concluded that there were no Article
III barriers to the plaintiffs' nuisance, negligence, and trespass claims, the
court did conclude that prudential barriers existed to preclude the plain-
148. Id. at 865.
149. Id. (citation omitted).
150. The Fifth Circuit summed up the import of the Supreme Court's holding in
Massachusetts as follows:
Thus, the Court accepted a causal chain virtually identical in part to that
alleged by plaintiffs, viz., that defendants' greenhouse gas emissions contrib-
uted to warming of the environment, including the ocean's temperature, which
damaged plaintiffs' coastal Mississippi property via sea level rise and the
increased intensity of Hurricane Katrina. In fact, the Massachusetts Court rec-
ognized a causal chain extending one step further-i.e., that because the EPA
did not regulate greenhouse gas emissions, motor vehicles emitted more green-
house gasses than they otherwise would have, thus contributing to global
warming, which injured Massachusetts lands through sea level rise and
increased storm ferocity.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
151. Interpreting once again the Massachusetts holding, the Comer court found as
follows:
In rejecting the EPA's argument that its regulation of domestic new car emis-
sions would have insignificant, if any, salutary effect on global warming, the
Court concluded that "[alt a minimum ... EPA's refusal to regulate [green-
house gas] emissions 'contributes' to Massachusetts' injuries," and therefore
sufficiently demonstrates traceability so as to support Massachusetts' standing.
Thus, the Court recognized, in the same context as the instant case, that inju-
ries may be fairly traceable to actions that contribute to, rather than solely or
materially cause, greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.
Id. at 866 (alterations and emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
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tiffs' claims based on unjust enrichment, fraudulent misrepresentation
and civil conspiracy.
152
II. THE STANDING OF MUNICIPALITIES: PUBLIC ACTIONS, PRIVATE
RIGHTS, AND THE IMPACT OF MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA
A. Public Actions, Private Rights and Individualized Harm
1. Municipalities and Nuisance Actions
As stated previously, the law of standing has suffered from an ideo-
logical "tug-of-war" between those who wish to narrow it considerably
(or abolish it altogether), and those who see its broad application as cen-
tral to preserving the proper role of the federal courts in the federal con-
stitutional structure.1 53 For proponents of the broad view, the federal
courts' proper role is to adjudicate "cases" or "controversies" in accor-
dance with the original grant of judicial power found in Article III of the
Constitution. This grant, they argue, restricts the application of the fed-
eral judicial power to those types of cases recognized by the courts in the
first years after the founding of the republic. And they maintain that
doing so reflects the Founders' understanding of the meaning of the term
"cases and controversies. 154
Justice Frankfurter's made this argument explicitly and succinctly in
his concurring opinion in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Commission v.
McGrath,155 where he argued that the "case" and "controversy" require-
ment of Article III:
mean[s] that a court will not decide a question unless the nature
of the action challenged, the kind of injury inflicted, and the rela-
tionship between the parties are such that judicial determination is
consonant with what was, generally speaking, the business of the
Colonial courts and the courts of Westminster when the Constitu-
tion was framed. 156
Consistent with this view of standing, only individuals who are the
"objects" of government actions that have invaded a common law or stat-
utory right are afforded standing to sue to remedy such an invasion. Pro-
152. Id. at 867-69.
153. Tyler Welti, Note, Massachusetts v. EPA Regulatory Interest Theory: A Vic-
tory for the Climate, Not Public Law Plaintffi, 94 VA. L. REv. 1751, 1756 (2008).
154. In support of this viewpoint, then-Judge Scalia authored a law review article,
published in 1983, asserting that the standing requirement has its origins in the vesting of
"the judicial power" over "cases" and "controversies" in Article III of the U.S. Constitu-
tion, and that this requirement is consistent with "the sort of business courts had tradi-
tionally entertained, and hence of the distinctive business to which they were presumably
to be limited under the Constitution." Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an
Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REv. 881, 882 (1983).
155. 341 U.S. 123 (1950).
156. Id. at 150 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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fessor Cass Sunstein has attributed this approach to two seemingly
divergent jurisprudential developments: a Lochner-era resistance to the
new administrative state at the time and a New Deal-era resistance to
those who might challenge this state. 157 It has been labeled the "private-
law model of public law," 158 and Sunstein describes its origins and effects
as follows:
Not fully developed until the New Deal, the private-law model
played a large role in legal doctrine between the late 1930s and the
early 1960s. The principal problem with that model-widely rec-
ognized in the 1960s and 1970s-was that it distinguished
sharply between the legal rights of regulated entities on the one
hand and those of regulatory beneficiaries on the other. The inter-
ests of regulated industries could be protected through the courts,
whereas the interests of regulatory beneficiaries were to be vindi-
cated through politics or not at all.
159
Opposing the private-law model are those who support a broader
notion of the power of Article III courts and, more importantly, Con-
gress's power to give meaning to the term "cases and controversies."
According to this view, Congress can identify harms it wishes to remedy,
through judicial action if necessary, and grant a cause of action to those
suffering such harms. The judicial review provisions of the Administra-
tive Procedures Act (APA) enshrine this view, providing that "[a] person
suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof."' 16' Although adopted in 1946, it was
not until the 1960s that courts recognized the APA's expansive view and
conferred standing not just on direct objects of government regulation,
but also on beneficiaries of regulatory statutes seeking to vindicate the
protections that such regulation afforded them.16 1 Proponents of this
view argue that it is consistent with the constitutional structure that
Congress can identify harms, create causes of action, and confer standing
on those aggrieved within the meaning of Congressional directives. It is
considered the "public-law" model of standing.162
157. See Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1432, 1436-38 (1988) ("The use of common-law notions, sharply
distinguishing between statutory benefits and nineteenth century private rights, was the
central mark of the jurisprudence of the Lochner period."); see also Steven L. Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. Rzv. 1371,
1394-96 (1988).
158. Sunstein, supra note 157, at 1436.
159. Id. at 1433.
160. 5 U.S.C. §702 (2006).
161. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 183-85.
162. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 8, at 255-65 (comparing the Court's approach
to administrative law cases from "the 1930's and 1940's when it invoked analogies to
common law injuries to infer congressional intent" to "what the Court has done more
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A central component of the private law model is that litigants must
show some individualized harm to have standing to challenge the con-
duct causing such harm. A historical analysis of the underpinnings of the
private law model shows that various causes of action were available to
litigants where they did not need to show any particularized injury, how-
ever. Furthermore, a plaintiff could be the beneficiary of a legal duty and
not merely its object, and could raise the rights of others or even the
community as a whole. One example is the mandamus action, where one
could assert that a duty was owed the public generally, regardless of
whether the defendant's failure to comply with the law harmed the plain-
tiff bringing the action specifically. 6 3 Similarly, the informer's action
permitted a private party to bring a claim alleging that a public officer
was failing to uphold a legal duty. In such a case, the plaintiff would
share a portion of the financial proceeds from the action.16 4 A third
example is the qui tam action, where a private plaintiff could sue to
enforce the criminal law against an offending party, regardless of whether
that plaintiff was in fact injured by that conduct. This type of action was
readily available at the common law in early American law. 16 5 Given this
background, the historical basis for the "individualized harm" require-
ment of standing doctrine is called into question.
In a forceful dissent in Flast v. Cohen, Justice Hearlan noted that,
historically, courts recognized causes of action brought by representative
plaintiffs, and not just those who were able to show some discrete and
individualized injury.1 66 He wrote:
Surely it is plain that the rights and interests of taxpayers who
contest the constitutionality of public expenditures are markedly
different from those of "Hohfeldian" plaintiffs, including those
taxpayer-plaintiffs who challenge the validity of their own tax lia-
recently[,]" and concluding that "the Court may properly invoke background assump-
tions about the functions of judicial review in certain areas, and about traditional catego-
ries of recognized injuries and permissible plaintiffs in those areas").
163. For an analysis of early state court cases in which writs of mandamus were
sought to enjoin threatened illegal conduct that might harm a community, but were not
based on some particularized and individual harm to an individual plaintiff, see Winter,
supra note 157, at 1399-1404. In such cases, the author concludes, "[tlhere was no
requirement of injury-in-fact or typicality as with the representation of the interests of a
class in the modem class action." Id. at 1403. See also Union Pac. R.R. v. Hall, 91 U.S.
343 (1875) (finding merchants could sue railroad for exercise of a duty owed to the entire
public, not just to those plaintiffs).
164. Winter, supra note 157, at 1406-09 (outlining availability of "informers"
suits during colonial and post-colonial times where a member of the public could sue to
ensure government agent compliance with the law, and receive a bounty for costs savings
to the government that resulted). In such cases, "[sluits by those without personal injury
who were acting as representatives of others were not viewed as raising constitutional
problems under article III." Id. at 1409.
165. Sunstein, supra note 8, at 175.
166. 392 U.S. 83, 116 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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bilities. We must recognize that these non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs
complain, just as the petitioner in Frothingham sought to com-
plain, not as taxpayers, but as "private attorneys-general." The
interests they represent, and the rights they espouse, are bereft of
any personal or proprietary coloration. They are, as litigants,
indistinguishable from any group selected at random from among
the general population, taxpayers and nontaxpayers alike. These
are and must be, to adopt Professor Jaffe's useful phrase, "public
actions" brought to vindicate public rights.
It does not, however, follow that suits brought by non-
Hohfeldian plaintiffs are excluded by the "case or controversy"
clause of Article III of the Constitution from the jurisdiction of
the federal courts. This and other federal courts have repeatedly
held that individual litigants, acting as private attorneys-general,
may have standing as "representatives of the public interest."'
67
In addition to the categories of cases brought by representative
plaintiffs noted above, another area that has enjoyed scant attention in
this debate is public nuisance law. The ability of governmental bodies to
punish and seek to enjoin public nuisances is said to be of "ancient ori-
gin."'1 68 Joseph Story traced the authority back to the reign of Queen
Elizabeth, 169 and one of the earliest nuisance cases, from 1535, noted
with approval the ability of the crown to punish public nuisances.
1 7 1
167. Id 119-20. Thus, as this quote indicates, although Harlan disagreed with
the outcome in Flast, where the Court granted taxpayer standing to challenge alleged
Establishment Clause violations in Congressional appropriations, he agreed with the
main thrust of the holding of the majority in that decision: i.e., that, throughout history,
Article III's "case and controversy" requirement has not prohibited individuals from
bringing derivative or representative claims.
168. City of Chicago v. Festival Theater Corp., 91 111. 2d 295, 303 (1982) (cita-
tions omitted).
169. See JOSEPH STORY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §§ 921-24 (13th ed. 1998),
cited in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 627, 672-73 (1887); see also RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS, §821B, com. a, (1979) ("In its inception a public, or common, nui-
sance was an infringement of the rights of the Crown .... By the time of Edward III the
principle had been extended to the invasion of rights of the public, represented by the
Crown, by such things as interference with the operation of a public market or smoke
from a lime-pit that inconvenienced a whole town.").
170. In the famous "anonymous" case from the King's Bench in 1535, a dissent-
ing judge posited a hypothetical, in dictum, about the need for a special injury when a
private individual brings a public nuisance action. Y.B. Mich. 27 Hen. 8, Mich., f. 26, pl.
10 (1535), reprinted in C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW:
TORT AND CONTRPACT (1949). It is often argued that the "special injury" rule can be
traced from this decision. But in the text of the majority opinion, it is assumed that the
Crown had standing to sue, regardless of the presence of a special injury:
It seems to me that this action does not lie to the plaintiff for the stopping of
the highway; for the King has the punishment of that, and he has his plaint in
the Leet and there he has his redress, because it is a common nuisance to all the
King's lieges ....
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Historically, governmental bodies have long held the power to com-
mence public actions without proof of special injury. The authority to
commence litigation to enjoin a public nuisance is said to vest in govern-
mental bodies; 17 1 just which public body, though, is subject to some
debate. It is without question that under U.S. law states have long
enjoyed the ability to commence cases in equity to enjoin public nui-
sances. 172 In nuisance law generally, the difference between a public nui-
sance and a private nuisance has traditionally been that only a
governmental body with the authority to commence such actions has
standing to bring a public nuisance action-i.e., one that seeks to enjoin
actions that harm the public generally-unless an individual can show
some special damages from the allegedly offensive conduct.' 7 3 According
to black letter law, when the appropriate governmental body is seeking
relief from a public nuisance, it need not plead and prove special injury;
rather, harm to the community is all it must show. With such public
nuisance cases, then, the "private-law model" of standing-one that
embraces the notion of individualized injury-is inconsistent with what
courts have been doing with these cases for centuries.
If a governmental body can pursue a public nuisance action, it begs
the question: what is an appropriate governmental body to commence
such an action? State governments, in their quasi-sovereign capacity, are
the traditional entities to wield such authority. 174 State legislatures can
Id. For a discussion of the "anonymous" case, see Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing Public
Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 755, 790-96
(2001); see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS § 90, at 646
(5th ed. 1984). It is worth noting that nowhere in this opinion is there any mention of
the King needing to allege some special injury to his proprietary interest in order to bring
suit.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821C(2) (1979) ("In order to main-
tain a proceeding to enjoin to abate a public nuisance, one must... (b) have authority as
a public official or public agency to represent the state or a political subdivision in the
matter .... "); DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS' LAW OF TORTS, §467 (2000) ("In the absence of
a statute allowing citizens to enforce the public's rights, those rights are normally enforced
only by public authorities.") (footnote omitted).
172. See Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex. rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
603-05 (listing state actions involving suits to enjoin public nuisances); see also JOSEPH A.
JOYCE & HowARD C. JOYCE, TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING NuISANcES, §437
(1906) (outlining the power of states to bring nuisance actions). Admittedly, this power is
often considered a part of the parens patriae authority of the state, which municipalities
do not generally enjoy. On the issue of municipalities and parens patriae standing, see
Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City Governments & Predatory Lending, 34
FoRDHAM URB. L.J. 757, 762-66 (2007).
173. DOBBS, supra note 171 at § 467. The private litigant's need to show special
injury is contrasted with the governmental authority's freedom to bring suit in the
absence of a special injury. This contrast undercuts the argument that even governmental
bodies must show some harm to a proprietary interest.
174. See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901) ("It is true that no
question of boundary is involved, nor of direct property rights belonging to the com-
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grant municipalities, counties, and localities the ability to pursue such
claims through state constitutions and "home rule" legislation. 17 5 Under
the common law, however, courts have often said that such local govern-
mental bodies have the ability to commence public nuisance actions on
their own, independent of grants of power by the legislature. 176 Similarly,
plainant State. But it must surely be conceded that, if the health and comfort of the
inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is the proper party to represent and defend
them."). A state's ability to rein in public nuisances is said to derive from its stature as a
quasi-sovereign within the federal constitutional structure, Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458
U.S. at 602, whereas a municipality's authority to regulate public nuisances derives from
the police power, which is often delegated to localities through state constitutional provi-
sions. 6A McQuillin, Mun. Corp. § 24.65 (3d ed. 2010).
175. For a discussion of "home rule" legislation and municipal standing, see Kath-
leen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory Lending,
38 CONN. L. REv. 355, 366-67 (2006). See also Town of East Troy v. Soo Line. R.R.
Co., 653 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (7th Cir. 1980) (discussing Wisconsin home rule legisla-
tion granting localities ability to bring nuisance actions but requiring showing of "pecu-
liar" injury). The U.S. Supreme Court did issue one curious opinion in the early
nineteenth century in which it held that the "corporation" of the town of Georgetown
lacked the authority to bring a public nuisance action to enjoin a company acting pursu-
ant to an Act of Congress because such power was not set forth in the plaintiffs corporate
charter. The court did not appear to recognize any governmental role for the corporation.
Mayor of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1838). Contrast
that with Coates v. Corporation of New York, where New York's highest court recognized
the right of the city of New York to bring a public nuisance action around the same time.
7 Cow. 585 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1827) (recognizing authority of municipality to rein in public
nuisances where "a contrary doctrine would strike at the root of all police regulations).
176. See, e.g., City of Tulsa v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1263, 1290
(N.D. Okla. 2003) (holding that municipality had standing to sue over injunction based
on common law and state statutory authority); Duncan v. City of Tuscaloosa, 60 So.2d
438 (Ala. 1952) (holding that city has authority to sue over public nuisance even in the
absence of statutory authority); Pearson v. Birmingham, 47 So. 80 (Ala. 1908) (holding
"settled" that municipalities can bring actions to abate public nuisances on city streets);
City of Chicago v. Festival Theatre Corp., 438 N.E.2d 159, 162 (Ill. 1982) (holding
authority of municipality to pursue public nuisance action was not defined by statute);
City of Grand Rapids v. Weiden, 56 N.W. 233 (Mich. 1893) (entertaining suit by
municipality to enjoin operation of slaughterhouse without questioning authority to sue);
City of New York v. Montague, 145 A.D. 172, 175 (N.Y. App. Div. 1911) ("The right of
the city to maintain an action to abate a public nuisance is too well settled to require the
citation of authorities."); City of Huron v. Bank of Volga, 66 N.W. 815 (S.D. 1896)
(ruling on merits of nuisance claim of city without questioning municipality's ability to
bring suit); see also JOYCE & JOYCE, supra note 161, at §439 (outlining authority of
municipalities to seek to enjoin nuisances affecting health of local inhabitants); FRED F.
LAWRENCE, A TREATISE ON THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, §864
(1929) (noting recognition of municipalities to bring public nuisance actions); JOHN
NORTON POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, 2078 (2d ed. 1892) ("A court of equity
has jurisdiction to restrain existing or threatened public nuisances by injunction, at the
suit of the attorney general, in England, and at the suit of the state, or the people, or
municipality, or some proper officer representing the Commonwealth, in this country.");
John G. Culhane & Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Defining a Proper Role for Public Nuisance
Law in Municipal Suits Against Gun Sellers: Beyond Rhetoric and Expedience, 52 S.C. L.
REv. 287, 298-99 (2001) ("Even absent such an express grant of authority, decisional
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at least two federal circuit courts have already held that municipalities
have standing in their own right to pursue public nuisance actions under
federal common law." 7
This review of historical approaches to public nuisance law calls into
question the relevance of the private-law model of standing to such
actions. Devised in an era of the expansion of government regulations,
which were themselves a response to the perceived inadequacies of the
common law in protecting the public, the rise of standing doctrine-at
least the private-law approach-is a reflection of an attempt by the courts
to limit access for those plaintiffs who wish to challenge regulatory action
or inaction. When such plaintiffs do not share attributes with litigants
who would have had causes of action or interests under the common law,
the private-law view of standing doctrine would deny such plaintiffs their
day in court, especially when they are the beneficiaries of government
regulation and not the objects of that regulation. 178 Thus, the private-law
model confers standing on those who are the objects of regulation, and
not its beneficiaries, and on those private parties who would have causes
of action under the common law. Because of this focus, it would seem
that the private-law model is simply inapplicable when entities with com-
mon law authority to regulate certain conduct use a well-recognized and
traditional common law tool for regulating that conduct-i.e., activities
that create a public nuisance. 17 9 As such, it would seem to have no place,
and its application would appear irrelevant, in actions long familiar
under the common law-e.g., the governmental public nuisance action.
Admittedly, who can bring such actions raises a separate question. But
the fact remains that courts have long recognized the viability of the pub-
lic nuisance action apart from any individualized harm suffered by the
plaintiff-governmental body. In other words, to bring such an action a
governmental body need only show that a nuisance harms a community
law has recognized the implicit right of a local authority to abate nuisances within its
limits."); 6A McQuillin Mun. Corp. § 24:75 (3rd ed.) ("Municipal corporations gener-
ally are entitled to appropriate judicial relief against public nuisances.").
177. Am. Elec. Power, 582 F.3d at 359-60; City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid
Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cit. 1979). In Am. Elec. Power, it was alleged that
New York City was threatened with harm to its "coastal infrastructure" from rising tides
due to global warming. 582 F.3d at 342 In City of Evansville, the appellate court endorsed
the right of municipal plaintiffs to bring a federal common law nuisance claim seeking
compensation for the cities' cleanup costs associated with the defendants' alleged toxic
releases into the local water supply. 604 F.2d at 1017-1019.
178. In his opinion for the majority in Lujan, Justice Scalia made this objects-
beneficiaries distinction explicit. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562
(1992) ("M[When the plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inac-
tion he challenges, standing is not precluded, but it is ordinarily 'substantially more diffi-
cult' to establish.") (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984)).
179. OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW, §115 (3d ed.
2009) (noting historical role of nuisance actions to regulate land use control).
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as a whole, and not that it has suffered some special and individualized
injury sufficient to grant it standing under the Lujan analysis.
To the extent that the other "irreducible constitutional minimum of
standing"1S°-causation and redressability-still must be established, the
next section takes up these issues, with particular emphasis on the ways
in which the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts addressed the
proper treatment of such elements of the standing inquiry. But first, a
brief review of other aspects of the "individualized injury" inquiry, spe-
cifically as it relates to the types of harms cities can allege, is in order.
2. Massachusetts v. EPA and the Harm to Proprietary Interests
After noting the "special solicitude" states enjoy in the standing
analysis, the Court in Massachusetts went on to note that Massachusetts
had met the most exacting standing requirements because it was itself a
property owner and owned lands that were threatened by rising water
levels due to climate change.18 This analysis offers guidance to courts
seeking to apply the Lujan factors to municipal lawsuits, even where such
municipalities may enjoy the state law right to bring public nuisance
actions on their own to protect community interests.
a. Impact on City-Owned Property
Municipalities are landowners. Whether it is commercial real estate
where municipal offices can be found, properties seized for delinquent
taxes, or park land, municipalities own property and hold it in their pro-
prietary capacity. As a result, municipalities can allege damage to such
property due to actions that diminish the value of that property. The
question in such cases will necessarily be whether the defendant's actions
cause the diminution in the value of the property and whether courts can
offer redress. I will return to those questions in a moment.
b. Harm to the Tax Base: Gladstone Realtors and the Fair Housing Act
In the context of fair housing litigation, the Supreme Court has
already found that municipalities can assert harm to their tax base as a
cognizable harm to be taken into account in the standing analysis. In
Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, a municipality brought an action
against real estate brokers for steering prospective white and black home-
owners to certain neighborhoods within the city, which, it was alleged,
might have resulted in the creation of segregated neighborhoods in the
city.182 The plaintiffs alleged further that such segregation might sup-
press property values. The Court accepted these allegations, noting:
180. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
181. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521.
182. 441 U.S. 91, 109-11 (1979).
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The adverse consequences attendant upon a "changing" neighbor-
hood can be profound. If petitioners' steering practices signifi-
candy reduce the total number of buyers in the Bellwood housing
market, prices may be deflected downward. This phenomenon
would be exacerbated if perceptible increases in the minority pop-
ulation directly attributable to racial steering precipitate an exodus
of white residents. A significant reduction in property values
directly injures a municipality by diminishing its tax base, thus
threatening its ability to bear the costs of local government and to
provide services. Other harms flowing from the realities of a
racially segregated community are not unlikely. As we have said
before, "[t]here can be no question about the importance" to a
community of "promoting stable, racially integrated housing." If,
as alleged, petitioners' sales practices actually have begun to rob
Bellwood of its racial balance and stability, the village has standing
to challenge the legality of that conduct.'
8 3
The questions of causation and redressability are nowhere to be
found in the court's Gladstone Realtors decision, a point to which I will
return shortly.
B. Causation
The Court's decision in Massachusetts clarifies the application of the
causation prong of the standing analysis.184 There, the Court found as
follows:
EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection
between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global warming.
At a minimum, therefore, EPA's refusal to regulate such emissions
"contributes" to Massachusetts' injuries.
EPA nevertheless maintains that its decision not to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles contributes so
183. Id. at 110-11 (citations and footnote omitted) (quoting Linmark Assoc., Inc.
v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977)).
184. In the Court's discussion of the causation and redressibility elements of the
standing inquiry in Massachusetts, the majority opinion draws no distinction in its analy-
sis under these prongs between Massachusetts's position as a quasi-sovereign and its status
as a landowner, suggesting that there are no separate standing tests for governmental
plaintiffs as opposed to private plaintiffs. Thus, the "special solicitude" afforded public
plaintiffs appears relevant in the standing analysis only to the first prong of the inquiry:
i.e., when assessing the harm a public litigant is alleged to have suffered. Similarly, the
Court in Massachusetts failed in its analysis of the harm suffered by the plaintiff-state to
make a clear distinction between procedural harms and non-procedural harms. For a
discussion of those aspects of the Massachusetts decision that relate to so-called procedural
harms and the Court's lack of clarity with respect thereto, see Bradford Mank, Should
States Have Greater Standing Rights Than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA s New
Standing Testier States, 49 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 1701, 1747-1752 (2008).
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insignificantly to petitioners' injuries that the agency cannot be
haled into federal court to answer for them. For the same reason,
EPA does not believe that any realistic possibility exists that the
relief petitioners seek would mitigate global climate change and
remedy their injuries. That is especially so because predicted
increases in greenhouse gas emissions from developing nations,
particularly China and India, are likely to offset any marginal
domestic decrease.'
85
The Court did not dispute any of these assertions, but went on to
accept the plaintiffs' allegations that vehicle emissions from cars in the
United States constituted 6% of global greenhouse gas emissions-even
though the litigation was over whether the EPA would regulate emissions
from new motor vehicles, which would necessarily entail a fraction of
even this fractional share of global emissions. Nevertheless, and despite
the fact that there are obviously other entities that contribute to global
emissions-i.e., the sources of the other 94% of global greenhouse gas
emissions-the Court concluded that the EPA "overstat[ed] its case."' 86
It found:
Its argument rests on the erroneous assumption that a small incre-
mental step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a
federal judicial forum. Yet accepting that premise would doom
most challenges to regulatory action. Agencies, like legislatures, do
not generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory
swoop. They instead whittle away at them over time, refining their
preferred approach as circumstances change and as they develop a
more-nuanced understanding of how best to proceed. That a first
step might be tentative does not by itself support the notion that
federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether that step
conforms to law.' 8
7
The fact remains, however, that the EPA does not cause greenhouse
gas emissions. Rather, it was alleged, only a small fraction of all green-
house gases emanate from U.S. motor vehicles. Even then the litigation
was not over present greenhouse gases, but rather the greenhouse gases
that would come from new motor vehicles in the absence of the EPA 's
decision to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from such vehicles in the future.
Thus, the harm the EPA "caused" was the threat that new vehicle emis-
sions would continue the pace of global warming. This pace would, in
turn, threaten the coastline of Massachusetts. Of course, this chain of
causation contains many variables, most of which are beyond the power
of the EPA to control. First, the EPA could decide to set weak limits on
greenhouse gas emissions (admittedly, this is in the agency's power to
185. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523-24.
186. Id. at 524.
187. Id. (citations omitted).
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control). Moreover, other sources of such emissions, literally millions of
them, could increase their rate of emissions, thus negating any reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles in the United
States-if any were achieved in the first place. Given the countless
sources of greenhouse gas emissions that also contribute to global warm-
ing, at best the harms that might befall the plaintiffs in the future might
be only of a minimally lesser degree in the event the EPA decides to rein
in new vehicle emissions. 188
The harm the EPA allegedly causes is that it has failed to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new U.S. motor vehicles. Along with
many other factors (contributing an overwhelming majority of the gases
that cause global warming), this failure contributes to global warming, at
most, to just a slim fraction of all greenhouse gas emissions. Despite these
countless other sources of greenhouse gas emissions, the plaintiffs in Mas-
sachusetts nevertheless showed that the EPA has "caused" the harm to a
sufficient degree to satisfy the causation requirement. Thus, even though
the countless other parties completely beyond the control of the defen-
dant-EPA contribute the vast majority of gases to increase global warm-
ing, and the EPA does not itself emit any global emissions, its failure to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions nevertheless satisfies the "causation"
prong of the standing inquiry.
Thus, the Court's holding can fairly be read to say that if one can
trace a government entity's failure to regulate a third party to the fact
that one is harmed by that failure to regulate-even to some small degree
and despite the fact that many other third parties beyond the defendant's
control cause the lion's share of one's injuries-the "causation" element
of the standing inquiry is satisfied. When one sues the third party itself
then, even a third party that contributes only a small percentage toward
the injuries, "causation" should similarly be established.
Given the evolution of the law of standing with respect to causation
that Massachusetts reveals, it appears that courts need to take a fresh look
at causation in municipal lawsuits; indeed, the ways in which courts have
looked at causation at times appears to contradict the Court's treatment
of the issue in Massachusetts. 8 9 Actions that contribute to harm, even
188. Chief Justice Roberts summarized the plaintiffs' standing argument as
follows:
Petitioners view the relationship between their injuries and EPA's failure to
promulgate new motor vehicle greenhouse gas emission standards as simple
and direct: Domestic motor vehicles emit carbon dioxide and other greenhouse
gases. Worldwide emissions of greenhouse gases contribute to global warming
and therefore also to petitioners' alleged injuries. Without the new vehicle stan-
dards, greenhouse gas emissions-and therefore global warming and its attend-
ant harms-have been higher than they otherwise would have been; once EPA
changes course, the trend will be reversed.
Id at 543 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
189. See, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore, 677 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
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when other forces may also be responsible for that harm, even over-
whelmingly, are actionable. For example, where a reduction in a munici-
pality's tax base is due to an increase in foreclosures, the forces that
contribute to those foreclosures may be subject to suit. In such a suit, the
municipality should be able to satisfy the causation prong of the standing
analysis, since an action that contributes to an actionable harm is consid-
ered to "cause" that harm for the purpose of the standing inquiry.'
90
Where illegal loan terms contribute to the reasons that individual bor-
rowers end up defaulting on their mortgages, the causation prong is met.
To what degree, and in what proportion to other causes those loan terms
have contributed to the municipality's losses in tax base, or the deprecia-
tion of properties the municipality owns, is a separate inquiry-one that
must be resolved in, for example, the damages phase of the proceedings.
But whether the standing test's causation prong is satisfied at least seems
to be answered in the affirmative after the Massachusetts decision.
Similarly, in Gladstone Realty, there was no question about whether
the broker-defendants in that case were the only potential causes of segre-
gation in a community. There are many forces that can lead to segrega-
tion, apart from the action of real estate brokers in steering potential
homebuyers to certain neighborhoods depending on the race of those
homebuyers. Bank practices like redlining, and the historical practice of
government entities insuring mortgages in communities based on the
race of the borrowers and the demographics of the neighborhood in
which the borrower wishes to purchase property, also contribute to segre-
gation. 9 1 It is hard to argue that the brokers in Gladstone Realty were
more than merely one in a chain of actors allegedly contributing to segre-
gation, yet the Supreme Court found that the municipality, which
alleged a potential drop in its tax base due to these brokers' actions, had
standing to challenge their behavior.
Turning to the context of municipal firearms litigation, the Massa-
chusetts precedent helps shore up the arguments in favor of standing here
190. In the Cleveland subprime mortgage litigation, the district court pointed out
that "Defendants stand atop a lengthy chain of events, far removed from the City's ulti-
mate damages." 621 F.Supp.2d at 534. Regardless, in light of the Massachusetts ruling,
whether there is a lengthy chain of causation or not, the correct inquiry is whether a party
contributes to the ultimate harm caused, not merely whether they are arguably remote
from that harm. In light of the fact that there the defendant investment banks did indeed
"stand atop" a chain of conduct by providing funding for the very mortgage products that
turned out to be toxic, suggests that they did indeed "contribute" the harms the city
alleges resulted from such conduct.
191. For an overview of federal housing policy and ways in which it contributed to
racial segregation in housing, see, DAN IMMERGLUCK, CREDIT TO THE COMMUNITY:
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT AND FAIR LENDING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 87-
108 (2004); Adam Gordon, The Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in
Banking Regulation Simultaneously Made Homeownership Accessihe to Whites and out of
Reach for Blacks, 115 YALE L. J. 186 (2005).
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too. To the extent that the presence of illegal firearms contributes to harm
to a municipality's tax base/property values due to increased crime,
municipal plaintiffs can meet the causation prong of the standing
inquiry. Such a showing would require the plaintiffs to establish that the
acts of the firearms manufacturers and distributors contribute to the
crime bringing down property values. Although there might also be other
causes of the crime, if the manufacturer distributes firearms in such a way
that they easily fall into the hands of criminals, and if that actually con-
tributes to the level of crime in a community, that should be sufficient to
establish the causation necessary to establish that element of the standing
analysis. On the other hand, if the design, marketing, or distribution of
firearms do not contribute to the level of crime in a community, munici-
pal plaintiffs would not be able establish the causation necessary to meet
the standing test. In any event, to what degree a faulty product contrib-
utes to a state of affairs causing actionable harm is not an issue for resolu-
tion at the pleading stage; rather, the degree of culpability-that is, the
extent to which a particular actor contributed to the harm-is more
appropriately resolved at the damages phase of the proceeding.
C. Redressability
The Supreme Court's holding on redressability is perhaps the most
wide-reaching aspect of Massachusetts. The Court addressed the issue as
follows:
While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions
will not by itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows
that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether EPA has a duty to take
steps to slow or reduce it. Because of the enormity of the potential
consequences associated with man-made climate change, the fact
that the effectiveness of a remedy might be delayed during the
(relatively short) time it takes for a new motor-vehicle fleet to
replace an older one is essentially irrelevant. Nor is it dispositive
that developing countries such as China and India are poised to
increase greenhouse gas emissions substantially over the next cen-
tury: A reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of
global emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.
In sum-at least according to petitioners' uncontested affida-
vits-the rise in sea levels associated with global warming has
already harmed and will continue to harm Massachusetts. The risk
of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real. That
risk would be reduced to some extent if petitioners received the
ON PUBLIC PLAINTIFFS AND PRIVATE HARMS
relief they seek. We therefore hold that petitioners have standing
to challenge the EPA's denial of their rulemaking petition.19 2
Thus "slowing or reducing the pace" of global warming is sufficient
to meet the redressability prong of the standing inquiry, even if the prob-
lem itself is not eradicated altogether by court intervention. This obvi-
ously has broad potential impact on standing analysis for years to come,
and suggests that courts and litigants must rethink their approach to
standing in a number of areas, let alone in municipal lawsuits.
Turning to municipal lawsuits specifically, in the financial crisis liti-
gation the extent to which judicial intervention could slow the pace of
foreclosures, and the decline in property values that result, should be
enough to find that municipal litigants have satisfied the redressability
requirement. Even if a large number of banks are involved in lending in a
particular community, if one bank's practices prove to be actionable, and
an injunction would prevent that bank from foreclosing on properties
with illegal terms,1 9 3 such intervention would necessarily slow the rate of
foreclosures in that community. Such a reduction in the foreclosure rate
will necessarily reduce the overall impact of foreclosures-that is, the
reduction in property values that flow from foreclosures-on that
community.
Similarly, in the firearms setting, to the extent the distribution of
firearms with features that tend to promote their use in criminal activity
increases the crime rate in a given community, if an injunction would
slow the growth of the crime rate, a litigant alleging such a fact would meet
the redressability requirement of the standing analysis. If a municipal
litigant can allege facts that tend to show that an injunction would have a
beneficial impact on the crime rate-even by slowing its growth, let
alone reducing it-that party would also be able to satisfy the redres-
sability prong of the standing inquiries.
III. CONCLUSION
Local governments often experience the fallout of destructive social
and economic trends acutely, more so than other levels of government.
Whether it is failing schools, economic distress, job loss, or violent crime,
these issues often play themselves out at the street level, where local gov-
ernments must find ways to deal with them day in and day out. To
combat the range of the social and economic challenges that cities face,
municipalities have sought to invoke a power that is said to be of
"ancient origin": the power to abate nuisances. The ability to wield this
power is sometimes limited by statute or state constitutions, but the
192. Id. at 525-26 (citations and footnotes omitted).
193. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass.
2008) (upholding injunction against bank foreclosing on loans with predatory loan
terms).
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power does exist, and cities are exploring ways that they can deploy this
authority effectively. This review has assessed the viability of one aspect
of such claims: municipal standing to sue. I submit that this review
reveals not only a long-standing body of doctrine in which municipalities
have the ability to commence nuisance actions on their own, but also
other avenues through which they can attempt to invoke this power-
i.e., by identifying the harm that those municipalities suffer to their pro-
prietary interests, as well as their tax bases.
The Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA also
addresses, if indirectly, the standing of municipalities to commence
actions to combat a range of social ills. With its approach to the "causa-
tion" and "redressability" prongs of the standing test lightening the bur-
den plaintiffs must meet to establish their standing to sue, all plaintiffs,
including municipalities, should have a far easier time overcoming the
standing hurdle in the types of lawsuits described here, and others that
might arise in the future.
The municipal lawsuit has its origins in a common law that is cen-
turies old. Yet the common law, and statutes that supplement it, can be
flexible to address the present needs of municipalities and other local
governments seeking powers that can combat present and future social,
economic and environmental problems. Rethinking traditional standing
doctrine in light of the history of municipal nuisance actions, as well as
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Massachusetts, should shed new
light on these legal challenges, opening the courthouse door to future
actions not only in the situations described above, but also for those still
unknown issues that may arise to plague local governments in the future.
